

501110351

PUBLIC LIBRARY
SEP 15 1953
DETROIT

THE AUSTRALIAN OUTLOOK

THE JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS



JUNE, 1953

Volume 7. No. 2.

QUARTERLY

Registered in Australia for transmission by post as a periodical

THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Australian Institute of International Affairs is an unofficial non-political body established in 1933 for the scientific study of international affairs. The Institute is affiliated to the Royal Institute of International Affairs and constitutes the Australian National Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The chief office-bearers of the Institute are:—

<i>Visitor</i>	-	-	-	-	His Excellency The Governor-General
<i>President</i>	-	-	-	-	Mr. T. N. M. Buesst
<i>Vice-Presidents</i>	-	-	-	-	Dr. I. Clunies Ross Mr. H. D. Black Mr. H. F. E. Whitlam Prof. G. Greenwood Prof. T. Hytten Sir Ross McDonald Mr. H. Plumridge
<i>Hon. Treasurer</i>	-	-	-	-	Mr. Russell N. Stokes
<i>Hon. Secretary</i>	-	-	-	-	Mr. K. A. Aickin
<i>Chairman of Research Committee</i>	-	-	-	-	Mr. H. D. Black

The addresses of the Branches are:

The Secretary A.I.I.A.
177 Collins Street
Melbourne

Hon. Sec. A.I.I.A.
232 George Street
Brisbane

Hon. Sec. A.I.I.A.
Exchange Building
26 Pirie Street
Adelaide

The Secretary A.I.I.A.
369 George Street
Sydney

Hon. Sec. A.I.I.A.
c/o Dept. of Territories
Canberra, A.C.T.

Hon. Sec. A.I.I.A.
c/o Public Library
Perth

Hon. Sec. A.I.I.A.
Dept. of History
University of Tasmania
Hobart

The Institute, as such, is precluded by its rules from expressing an opinion on any aspect of international affairs. Any opinions expressed in this Journal are, therefore, purely individual.

"The Australian Outlook" is published in March, June, September and December in each year. Subscription rates: in Australia 15/- a year; in Canada \$1.65; U.S.A. \$1.75; U.K., South Africa and New Zealand 12/6; India Rs. 8. Single copy 4/- (A.).

Overseas subscriptions may be placed with the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, London, S.W.1 and the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N.Y.

All communications should be addressed to the Commonwealth Secretary, The Australian Institute of International Affairs, 177 Collins St., Melbourne.

-
s.
d
s.

on
nal

nd
da
8.

er-
nd

ry,
ne.





(The Associated Press)

*Elizabeth the Second
by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom, Australia and her other Realms
and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith.*



Monday: Mr. and Mrs. [REDACTED] called. They are going abroad for six months so that Mr. [REDACTED] can study latest developments in his field.




World travellers start off on the right foot

Every year, the "Wales" gives thousands of travellers specialized free travel service. So I arranged for the Bank's travel department to book my customers' passages and make their hotel reservations. I also supplied them with a circular letter of credit and travellers' cheques. These will save them the risk of carrying too much money in cash. Wherever you go, you, too, can ensure trouble-free travel if you consult and use —



(INCORPORATED IN NEW SOUTH WALES WITH LIMITED LIABILITY)



THE AUSTRALIAN OUTLOOK

Vol. 7. No. 2

June, 1953

CONTENTS

Articles

PAGE

The Future in the Far East (Review Article)	-	<i>J. S. Furnivall</i>	75
Moscow's Peace Campaign	- - -	- - <i>A. Poninski</i>	85
Kenya and the Mau Mau	- - -	- <i>W. E. H. Stanner</i>	92
The North-West Pacific and the Korean War, Part I	- - -	<i>Sir Frederick Eggleston</i>	107
United Nations, Colonialism and Australia	- -	<i>C. Rowley</i>	120

Notes

The Dutch New Guinea Border	- - -	<i>J. Reynolds</i>	129
Treaties of Friendship	- - -	<i>J. Leyser</i>	132
Australia and the U.N.	- - -	<i>N. D. Harper</i>	135
The South Pacific Commission Conference	- -	<i>R. Neal</i>	137

Book Reviews

The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 1945-51 (M. A. Fitzsimmons)	- - -	<i>J. Ginswick</i>	139
Demographic Yearbook, 1952 (United Nations)	- - -	<i>W. D. Borrie</i>	141
Search After Sunrise (Vera Brittain)	-	<i>T. Inglis Moore</i>	142
Governmental Policies Concerning Unemployment, Inflation and Balance of Payments, 1951-52 (U.N.)	- -	<i>E. L. Wheelwright</i>	143
The State The Enemy (Sir Ernest Benn)	- -	<i>H. Mayer</i>	145
Congress. Its Contemporary Role (E. S. Griffith)	- - -	<i>H. D. Black</i>	145

Shorter Notices	- - - - -	- - - - -	147
-----------------	-----------	-----------	-----

Prize Article Competition	- - - - -	- - - - -	147
---------------------------	-----------	-----------	-----

Forthcoming Events	- - - - -	- - - - -	148
--------------------	-----------	-----------	-----

Institute News

Editor's Note	- - - - -	- - - - -	149
Around The Branches	- - - - -	- - - - -	149
A Forthcoming Review	- - - - -	- - - - -	151
Roy Milne Memorial Lecture	- - - - -	- - - - -	151

EDITOR: H. D. Black.

ASSISTANT EDITOR: O. A. Guth.

ASSOCIATE EDITORS: K. A. Aickin (Victoria), N. R. Collins (Western Australia), D. G. McFarling (South Australia), H. Mayer (New South Wales), T. Inglis Moore (Canberra), R. G. Neale (Queensland), W. A. Townsley (Tasmania).

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

- J. S. FURNIVALL:** Formerly in the Indian Civil Service (Burma), author of "Progress and Welfare in South-East Asia", "Colonial Policy and Practice", and numerous other works.
- A. PONINSKI:** Formerly of the Polish Diplomatic Service, author of numerous articles on international affairs, and a member of the Reading and Discussion Group in the N.S.W. Branch.
- W. E. H. STANNER:** Reader in Comparative Social Institutions, Australian National University.
- SIR FREDERICK EGGLESTON:** Formerly Australian Minister in China, and in the U.S.A.
- C. ROWLEY:** Principal, Australian School of Pacific Administration.
- J. REYNOLDS:** Lecturer in Geography, Australian School of Pacific Administration.
- J. LEYSER:** Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Melbourne.
- N. D. HARPER:** Senior Lecturer in History, University of Melbourne, and Director in charge of the Institute research project on national attitudes and policies towards United Nations.
- R. NEAL:** A.B.C. talks officer who was present at the Second South Pacific Conference in Noumea as the A.B.C. talks representative.
- J. GINSWICK:** Lecturer in Economic History, University of Sydney.
- W. D. BORRIE:** Reader in Demography, Australian National University.
- T. INGLIS MOORE:** Lecturer in Pacific Studies, Canberra University College.
- E. L. WHEELWRIGHT:** Lecturer in Economics, University of Sydney.
- H. MAYER:** Lecturer in Government, University of Sydney.
- H. D. BLACK:** Editor, "The Australian Outlook", Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of Sydney.

The Future In The Far East

J. S. Furnivall

Nationalism and Communism in East Asia, by W. Macmahon Ball (Melbourne University Press, 1952. 25s.).

IN this small book of barely two hundred pages, Mr. Macmahon Ball, Professor of Political Science in Melbourne University, aims at helping Western readers to understand more clearly the problems created for the West by the movements that are now transforming the Far East. For this task he has special qualifications. During recent years he has travelled widely in the region, either in a private or an official capacity, and his academic background serves to check distortion of the perspective by superficial impressions. His view is that everywhere the people are in the throes of a revolution due to three main forces: resentment of political subjugation, of economic backwardness and of social inferiority. These forces are sometimes fused, sometimes run parallel, and sometimes are in mutual conflict. The survey includes India, but otherwise it is confined to the Mongolian world and covers all the world that is most typically Mongolish. In successive chapters he applies his analysis to each country, and depicts the main features of the present situation.

A long national history and enlightened leadership inspired Japan to face the challenge of the West, with such success that it became a colonial power and finally grew bold enough to measure its strength against the Western powers. The arbitrament of war reduced it to the status of a colonial dependency; disarmed, demilitarized and with its industrial production restricted to the amount sufficient to pay war reparations. The suppression of nationalism stimulated communism, until the communists acquiesced in submission to the strategic interests of Russia. The repudiation of communism was rewarded by the Peace Treaty of 1951, which allows Japan to rehabilitate its heavy industries and places no limits on rearmament. This treaty registers the immediate strategic ends of the United States. Both Russia and America covet Japan as an ally and it will have more value as an ally in proportion to its strength. But on the other hand China and its trade rivals among Western powers will have greater cause to fear it. Nationalism has defeated communism in Japan, but ideological divergence will not keep Japan apart from Russia if common interest brings them together. The treaty can only lead to peace

and security if embodied in a wider settlement embracing all the parties most closely concerned.

Until quite recently China was a civilisation and not a nation. Modern nationalism emerged by way of a reaction against Western economic penetration and Japanese aggression. Communism emerged a little later as a more emphatic form of the reaction. When the nationalist leaders of the Kuomintang neglected social and economic reforms in their haste to acquire wealth and to defeat rival leaders, and more intent on suppressing communists than on resisting the Japanese, nationalism among the people looked to the communists for leaders. The prolonged struggle against the Kuomintang and the Japanese gave the communist party sufficient strength to enforce communist discipline, and now the Korean war has tightened the links between communist China and the Soviet Union. It seems certain that China will be controlled by the communist party for the foreseeable future. But it is too soon to conclude that Chinese communism will be a permanent and inseparable ally of Russian communism.

Korea had been nationally self-conscious for about three centuries until it became a protectorate of Japan in 1905. The war left it divided at the 38th parallel, with Russia on the north and America on the south. In the north the government redistributed the land and built up an army; in the south it neglected the land problem and looked to America for defence. When the north invaded the south the United Nations with practical unanimity condemned the aggression and the northern army was beaten back to its former line. But the continued advance towards the Chinese frontier obscured the political and moral issues. It provoked anxiety and discord in the West and general opposition in the East, and led to Chinese intervention. Thus the conflict has become a power struggle between America and Russia, to the detriment of the moral authority of the United Nations, and there is no assurance of stability or peace unless the tension between East and West can be relieved.

Nationalism In Indo-China

In Indo-China national sentiment had been fostered for a thousand years by resistance against Chinese aggression and permeation. But French rule transformed national sentiment into modern nationalism, with Ho Chi Minh, a communist, obtaining popular support as a symbol of the struggle for national independence. Now it seems improbable that Bao Dai, so obviously a puppet, can defeat Ho Chi Minh by force of arms, even with much greater help from America. And so long as the conflict lasts it reconciles the people with their old enemies, the Chinese; transforms nationalism into communism; forges new links between Ho Chi Minh

June, 1953

and communist China, and gives him new reserves of strength to suppress whatever may still survive of anti-communist nationalism. The future lies between a puppet government subservient to western interests, and a popular government under communist control.

Modern nationalism in the Philippines dates from the rebellion against Spain. Under the United States it became a pawn in American domestic politics with the result that the Philippines obtained the outward forms of political independence without the substance of economic independence. The dominant political minority has more in common with American business than with its own people and looks to international capitalism for support. Its chief problem is to suppress armed resistance from the dispossessed, especially in the area of most rapid economic progress, who look to international communism for protection. But both sides find their real strength in the appeal to national sentiment.

Formerly Indonesia, like India and China, was a civilisation rather than a nation. The Dutch have exercised political supremacy over a longer period than the British in India. Their policy has always been to rule through local chieftains: Java did not come into effective contact with the West until after 1870 and Indonesia in general not until the present century. But leaders out of the local ruling order built up a nation on the basis of religion and sowed the seeds of communism by teaching their followers that their backwardness and poverty were due to "wicked" (i.e. foreign) capitalism. Under Japanese rule the communists led the national resistance but, with the collapse of the Japanese, the new Republic repudiated communism as opposed both to nationalism and religion. This brought them American support in negotiating with the Dutch for independence and the government still maintains the forms of Western democracy. But it is doubtful how far these will be compatible with the consolidation of national unity and the promotion of social welfare.

The British in Malaya likewise aimed to conserve the Malay social order under its own leaders. But in the interest of economic progress the government favoured Chinese and Indian permeation, which also hindered combination against British rule. Now, in a population of six million, the Chinese outnumber the Malays of whom many are themselves immigrants from Indonesia, and about 14 per cent is Indian, with a handful of Europeans directing political and economic life. In such a jumble racial sectionalism takes the place of nationalism, making for division instead of unity and weakening the resistance to communism, which further multiplies divisions by fostering class antagonism and rival ideologies within each racial section. Yet, suggests Professor Ball, "the risks of winning self-government too soon are perhaps less than those of winning it too late."

In Burma foreign elements were numerically less important. But, under

direct rule with no protection against the impact of economic forces, social disintegration within the local community proceeded further than in any Eastern land, and nowhere were the people so effectively segregated from modern industry and commerce. The forms of a quasi-democratic constitution exacerbated sectional discord, and their futility for promoting social welfare and national advancement encouraged some leaders to see in communism a short cut to independence and an instrument of social justice. As in Indonesia communists won support by heading the national resistance against Japan. But the grant of independence broke the alliance between communism and nationalism. Now "it may be that Burma is a crucial test case of whether the Western capitalist democracies are able and willing to do all in their power to ensure the survival of a non-communist state committed to achieve socialism by constitutional means."

Thailand Preserved Independence

Thailand alone of all the neighbouring countries has managed to preserve its independence, and the sacrifice of outlying provinces to France and Britain has not aroused a sense of inferiority in the same measure as foreign rule in colonial dependencies. The nationalist leaders, unable to attribute poverty to foreign rule, have lacked this incentive to foster social revolution. The main problem is the strong Chinese element which has emerged in the course of economic progress, and it is among the Chinese section that communism is strongest. In Thailand therefore communism is a foreign movement and, by reaction, strengthens nationalism among a people not yet conscious of any need for social and economic reforms.

The inclusion of India in this survey adds greatly to its value. When Europeans first landed in India they found a social order that was in many respects superior to their own. Permeation was gradual and modern India has grown up as part of the modern world, while the institution of caste protected it against the solvent influences of the economic forces liberated as the result of contact with the modern world. Also it inherited from British rule a reasonably efficient army, trained to obey the civil power. The other lands had to sustain the sudden impact of western peoples triumphantly superior in the material arts of life, and effective contact dates only from the opening of the Suez Canal in 1870. In lieu of caste the social order was held together by loose ties of personal fidelity. And in the former dependencies the native armed forces were few in number and of doubtful loyalty. In India, says Professor Ball, the prospects depend on the ability of the government to hold the loyalty of the army, the police and the officials, and on the capacity of the leaders to promote

June, 1953

social welfare. For the reasons just indicated the prospects in other newly independent countries are in these respects less favourable.

Professor Ball clearly demonstrates that everywhere the resultant of the triangle of forces tends in the direction of nationalism and communalism. If we are to deal successfully with the problems which this raises for the West it would seem well to look for general principles determining the force of the resultant and defining more exactly its direction. Possibly some light may be thrown on the matter by attempting a comparative analysis of what these various countries have in common and where and how they differ. We have noticed that in many ways India stands apart but, except for India, the whole region has much in common in its racial and social heritage, and it sustained in common the sudden mass impact of the modern West. The most obvious difference is that all the countries, with the exception of Japan, China and Thailand, lost their independence. Mr. Broderick, in one of his books on Southeast Asia, contrasts Thailand with Burma and Annam, saying that he felt more at home in a free land. The British merchant Gouger, visiting Burma while it was still under its own kings, similarly contrasts the free Burman with the fawning Indian. Even where Europeans did not rule, their superiority in the arts of modern life and their leading position in industry and commerce encouraged an irritating arrogance, sometimes deliberate but mostly unconscious. The reaction among the people ranged from servile submissiveness to crude self-assertion, but everywhere, and especially under foreign rule, there was at least a latent feeling of inferiority.

Except in Japan and China economic permeation was not confined to the leadership of industry and commerce, but economic progress and contact with the West encouraged the influx of an indigestible mass of foreign orientals, often with a lower standard of living than the local peoples. This partly diverted antagonism from the Europeans with whom the people were less intimately in contact, but intensified social malaise and discontent with the new environment. Another differentiating element was in the strength of the reaction to foreign permeation. This varied according to the degree of national self-consciousness attained before contact with the West. In Annam, Burma, Cambodia, Korea and Thailand, as in Japan, there was a long national tradition to which foreign permeation and foreign rule gave a new stimulus. In Indonesia and the Philippines they aroused a new sense of national unity, and in China a sense of national unity evolved more slowly, chiefly under pressure from the Japanese. In Malaya permeation was so rapid and complete that ideas of national unity had no meaning. Another point of difference was that in most cases the reaction was directed against the Western world, but in Korea it was directed primarily against Japan.

Religion Had Guiding Hand

Another factor colouring the reaction to foreign permeation was religion. Everywhere religion and nationalism went hand in hand but on the longest journey religion had the guiding hand. Many of these peoples looked beyond this world with a religion to lead them on their pilgrimage: in Burma, Cambodia and Thailand they were Buddhists; in Indonesia and Malaya, Moslems; and in the Philippines, Christians. Yet, although they had adopted a supra-national religion, they had woven it into their national life, and any hint of danger to religion inflamed nationalist susceptibilities. The tolerance of Buddhism discouraged active intervention by the clerics in nationalist politics. The Moslems were not restrained by any such inhibition. In the Philippines Christianity was a link with the West and in some measure a mitigation of Western rule. Yet even in the Philippines the native clergy were prominent in the rebellion against Spain. And in Burma, when the clergy entered politics, they carried their opposition to extremes. But Buddhist, Christian and Moslem were repelled by the anti-religious dogmatism of the communists. It was different in lands under the influence of China, where religion was either a substitute for national consciousness or, as in Japan, its vital expression. In India on the other hand nationalism was enfeebled by the rivalry of Hindu and Moslem.

In dependencies another cause of divergence was the policy of the ruling power. Everywhere this was directed to serving the material interests of the rulers, but these interests were served in different ways. In Indonesia of set purpose and in Malaya for practical convenience official policy aimed at preserving the native social order by indirect rule through native chieftains. At the other extreme, direct rule in Burma allowed economic forces to break down the village community into an aggregate of individuals.

These would seem to be the chief factors in determining the strength of the reaction to contact with the West and defining its exact alignment between communism and nationalism. Yet despite these local differences the general result has everywhere been very much the same. Everywhere there has been rapid economic progress, and everywhere in some degree there has evolved a plural society with a few, in most lands foreigners, amassing wealth and the great body of the people as poor as before, or poorer. Everywhere under foreign rule an ordered human society has been transformed into a business concern with many outward signs of prosperity. And everywhere the reaction has followed much the same course. In the early stages there were sporadic futile peasant risings. Then, from among those hanging on to the fringes of the West, there emerged a few leaders appealing to the people for support on religious grounds and subsequently on the material economic grounds of back-

June, 1953

wardness and poverty which they taught the people to ascribe to foreign intervention. At first they looked to Western education to provide a remedy. When this failed they thought to achieve power by the democratic machinery of Western lands. Again disappointed, they resorted to direct economic action and fomented strikes. From this it was a short step to dallying with communism. Everywhere the imposing fabric of business prosperity was in unstable equilibrium and at the first serious challenge it collapsed. It was the Japanese who touched off the explosion, but the collapse was due to the explosive force of an instinctive protest against the domination of human society by the economic forces which economic contact with the modern world had liberated.

The Japanese asserted their mastery with the crudeness of raw hands in imperial technique. But their rule, however unpleasant, allowed the local peoples to gain for the first time a foothold in industry and commerce through the elimination of the former business class. And they gained also some military experience by fighting as guerillas either for or against the Japanese. When the Japanese were driven out the people were not quite so helpless as before they came. And their experience under the Japanese confirmed them in their resolve to insist on political and economic independence. Yet hardly any of them knew anything about the modern world. There was a general lack of managerial and technical ability, and of labour broken to the discipline of industrial routine. Everywhere within the range of active military operations the pre-war foreign capital equipment had been destroyed, and the people had no means of making good the loss. The new leaders had to piece together the fragments into which the social order had disintegrated, and they aspired also to promote welfare. But the unification of recalcitrant minorities cannot be achieved rapidly without the use of force. And the promotion of welfare implies the multiplication of restrictions likely to foster disaffection. Yet the countries that have recently gained their independence have practically no armed forces. On the downfall of Japan what were the prospects for the future in the Far East? The outside world needed the rice, oil, rubber and other products of the region and was interested therefore in establishing conditions that would supply these products. What was to be done about it?

Capitalism And Communism

By this time the world was divided into two camps under the rival standards of capitalism and communism, with contrary solutions for the problem. The Western solution was proclaimed by Mr. Truman in "Point 4". "Greater production," he said, "is the key to prosperity and

peace." And the United Kingdom followed his lead with the Colombo Plan. Mr. Truman looked also to Western democracy as "a vitalizing force" that would rouse the people to triumphant action against "their ancient enemies—hunger, misery and despair". If more people are to eat more food, there must be more food for them to eat. But people too readily accept the contrary proposition that if people grow more food they will be able to eat more. Yet for the past hundred years Burmans have steadily been growing more rice while the consumption per head has been declining. Everywhere the most conspicuous result of economic contact with the West has been a rapid increase in production. Yet everywhere the masses have remained obstinately poor. Why should a further and more rapid increase in production have a contrary result in future? It sounds rather like prescribing a hair of the same dog as a tonic for a hangover. The usual answer is that production is to be increased by a shift from agriculture to industry. This finds ready acceptance among people who ascribe Western prosperity to the industrialisation from which Asians have been debarred. But how far is industrialisation practicable? Capital must be borrowed on terms congenial to Western lands, implying limitations on political and economic independence likely to offend nationalist susceptibilities. Given the capital, how soon can peoples who have been so completely shut off from modern industry and commerce provide enough leaders with sufficient managerial capacity and technical skill and an adequate supply of disciplined industrial labour? And so far as industrialisation may be practicable, who will reap the profits? Certainly, in its early stages, Western industry did not promote the labour welfare. Since then the humanitarian and democratic traditions of the West under the strong machinery of Western government in a stable social order have enabled labour to improve its lot in like measure as the organisation of labour has been possible. The industries were urban; agricultural labour, less easily organised, lagged behind, and the fields were deserted for the factories. And in Asia the rapid growth of the rural population coincided with the rapid growth of the urban population in the West. The two processes were complementary. How far will it be possible to enforce high wages and good conditions of employment in the disintegrated society of Eastern lands under a feeble government and with no similar humanitarian and democratic traditions? And what will be the reaction on earnings in agricultural employment and domestic crafts?

Assuming again that industry with capital borrowed from abroad, and with inefficient leadership and untrained and undisciplined labour can furnish surplus funds for welfare, what do we mean by welfare and, more important, what does it mean to the people? More schools and better

June, 1953

hygiene? Industrialisation may perhaps provide the funds for sufficient schools and schoolmasters, but how much will it cost to ensure that parents send their children to the schools. It may provide funds for an army of sanitary inspectors; but how much will it cost to make the people clean up their villages and houses? Until the people want what we regard as welfare the attempt to provide it will merely encourage waste and corruption, and it is much easier to waste money than to promote welfare. If the people's idea of welfare is higher wages and less work, how far is the increase of production compatible with democracy? And how far is the increase of production compatible with international pressure to enforce the higher wages and labour conditions that will protect Western enterprise and Western labour against competition from cheap labour in the East? National independence in the modern world implies the acceptance of Western standards of social discipline, and doubtless Eastern governments will readily pay lip service to these standards by the necessary legislation. But it will be less easy to enforce the legislation in any manner consistent with democratic principles as these are ordinarily understood in Western lands.

All these and many other difficult questions arise directly out of the Western solution of the problem. This solution is based on a faulty diagnosis of the disease. The poverty that Western doctors think to cure is merely a symptom of the disease of social disintegration, releasing appetite in rich and poor;

And appetite, an universal wolf,
Must make perforce an universal prey,
And last eat up himself.

The Western Solution

The Western solution demands a rapid increase of production; which is desirable of course in Western as well as local interests. But if this were possible, it would aggravate instead of curing social disintegration. Fortunately it is impossible. Within practicable limits, however, attempts to increase production should do more good than harm, provided that they are subordinate to the object of supreme importance, the creation of a new social order to replace that which has been shattered by contact with the West.

Here the alternative communist solution would seem more attractive. For it holds out the prospect of a new social order with welfare as a by-product. But communists are faced with the same obstacles as capitalists; the lack of capital, of leaders to employ the capital and of an efficient labour force. And it looks to obtain results not by the lure of

profit but by the chains of discipline—without an army to enforce discipline. The communist solution is even less practical than the capitalist solution, and no less certain to intensify social disintegration. In this respect, however, it starts with a tactical advantage over capitalism. For it deliberately aims at completing the destruction of the old order of society based on nationalism and religion. Except on one condition there is very little danger of seeing communism established in the Far East, but there is a great danger that, by fostering disorder, it will prevent the emergence of any type of social order.

On one condition only can communism prove successful. If the Western powers compel nationalists to look to communists for leaders and then try to suppress communism by force of arms, they will enable communist leaders to build up enough strength to enforce communist discipline. That is what happened in China. That is how France and America are working to build up a communist state in Indo-China. It is what Mr. Attlee in his wisdom prevented from happening in Burma. Professor Ball in some passages seems to accept the doctrine that in East Asia "the freedom most sought is freedom from poverty and insecurity", yet he insists also on the primary need for restoring social unity. And he recognizes that "if East Asia is to be saved from coming under the control of the Soviet Union, it will not be by Westerners but by East Asians". This is a sound moral to a little book imparting an astonishing amount of information. It is a tract for the times which should help Westerners, unclouded by prejudice, to avoid mistakes that will defeat their aspirations to incorporate East Asia in a free and prosperous new world.

Moscow's "Peace" Campaign

A. Poninski

STALIN'S disappearance created a power-vacuum in the Soviet Union and the international communist set-up which must eventually affect the whole Soviet leadership as well as Russia's relations with the outside world. Stalin was the most powerful single personality in recent Russian history. As supreme leader of the party and the chief of the government he had become identical with the cause of world-communism.

Some years ago foreign observers in Moscow and experts on Soviet affairs abroad were generally inclined to regard Molotov as Stalin's most probable successor. His unquestionable loyalty to the ageing dictator, his pre-eminent political position, his long and vast experience in internal and external affairs seemed unequalled when compared with qualifications and achievements of other members of the Politburo.

Nevertheless when early in 1952 confidential reports from diverse Moscow sources asserted that the progressive deterioration of Stalin's health might at any moment provoke his sudden death, several Western statesmen and columnists were keen to predict that the succession-issue would, most probably, produce a rift in the Politburo, if not a major political crisis in Soviet ruling circles.

Some months later press-reports suggested that Stalin had chosen a new "strong man" and a much younger one, for the supreme job of Soviet leader. G. M. Malenkov, hitherto a brilliant party organiser, efficient administrator and able economist, stepped in fact to the fore. Influential Cominform leaders and average members of the Soviet party secretariat contributed to build up Malenkov's reputation as the real force in Stalin's shadow.

Apart from Stalin, he was the only man occupying important positions in the Polit and Orgburo, the party secretariat and in the Soviet government alike.

While observing a humble and subservient attitude towards Stalin, his master and teacher, Malenkov displayed a remarkable activity to establish his direct influence on younger party members and to gain constant support of a group of friends inside the Politburo. He thus succeeded in becoming one of the Soviet policy-makers without displacing any of the elder party

leaders. In emphasizing this point we have to insist on the complete secrecy surrounding the work and whereabouts of Stalin's intimate collaborators. It was and it is still impossible to ascertain the relationship between the different, often oddly assorted men who form the inner circle of the Kremlin. Although nothing in this matter can be considered as definitely established, there had been rumors charging Malenkov with direct responsibility for Zhdanov's disappearance. The Latin proverb *fecit cui prodest* might be quoted in this connection. Malenkov had no chance whatever to make in so short a time such a speedy ascension to power, had dynamic and most cunning Zhdanov remained on the top of the Soviet pyramid.

Among the important tasks which Malenkov took over after Zhdanov's mysterious death probably the most important one was the overall preparation of the forthcoming party Congress.

Since 1939 the Central Committee and all other party organs had been solely renewed by cooptation and nomination and no elevations had taken place. The party, however, had tremendously expanded and its composition was thoroughly changed during the "patriotic" war and in the post-war years as well. That was also the reason why Stalin could not make up his mind as to the term of calling the XIXth Congress, which had been postponed for so many years. In the meantime the effective control over the party officials by state security organs, the notorious NVD and secret police, had been encouraged by Stalin to enforce party discipline and blind obedience of the rank and file to his instructions.

In his famous study on "Leninism" Stalin defined the function of the GPU, as the security-board was called at that time, in the following terms:

"The GPU is the punitive organ of the Soviet government: it is more or less similar to the Committee of Public Safety which existed during the great French revolution. It punishes primarily spies, plotters, terrorists, bandits, speculators, forgers. It is something in the nature of a military political tribunal set up for the purpose of protecting the interests of the revolution from attacks on the part of counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and their agents."

The Soviet state-security possess indeed rights and prerogatives like no other state or party bodies. It acts as judge, jury, executioner, all in one. The man in virtual control of the security—Lavrenty Beria—was therefore in the last years of Stalin's rule a most powerful influence behind the scenes. . . . He doubtless had his say in all decisions concerning the forthcoming Congress which had to proceed with elections to the highest party bodies and with establishing a policy program for years to come.

June, 1953

Competition And Dislike

Malenkov and Beria were thus bound to cooperate and Stalin rightly expected them to smoothly accomplish this great job. It was, however, known that both these men looked upon each other as competitors and profoundly disliked each other. But shortly before the announcement of the XIX Congress their controversies and frictions were reported to have been ironed out. Malenkov had taken the decisive step to bring about an agreement with Beria at Molotov's expense.

Western public opinion was shocked at the improbable news of this unexpected coalition of two former rivals who had been always known as fanatical communists and worshippers of naked power politics. Their notorious anti-Western record seemed to predict a most dangerous turn in the Cold War, enhancing the danger of a global world-conflagration. For the time being, however, Stalin continued to dominate the political scene and casual warnings on bellicose intentions of some of his trusted deputies had no further effect.

Then, on August 20, 1952, Moscow radio announced dramatically that the XIXth all union Congress of the communist party had been called for October 6th and important organisational changes would be submitted for its approval.

Proposals for the creation of a Presidium of the Central Committee in place of the Politburo and the Orgburo, as well as for a new committee of party control and a series of significant modifications in the party by-laws seemed to indicate that Stalin would proceed on this occasion with the obviously necessary redistribution of power inside the Soviet Union, so as to infuse a fresh stream of life into the bureaucratic party machine, if not to attempt some kind of democratisation of the petrified party leadership. Malenkov was designed to act during the Congress as Stalin's mouthpiece and to present the main policy report.

The free world was now at last aware that great things were brewing in the Kremlin. The peculiar internal tension, paired with a most offensive hate propaganda against the West, appeared now in a new light and outstanding Western columnists were tempted to recognise that a new Soviet leadership might be installed overnight by a Congress vote, with the old marshal fading out of the picture.

Instead the Congress elected a Central committee, headed by Stalin in person, and the former members of the "disbanded" Politburo, to begin with Molotov, Malenkov and Beria. It also elected a committee of ten, with Stalin as chairman, for the purpose of reshaping the party program and submitting proposals in this matter to the next congress, taking into

consideration the guiding principles outlined in Stalin's recent fundamental article in the "Bolshevik".

On the other hand, Malenkov pronounced a militant policy speech culminating in bitter attacks on the USA, Britain and France and strongly denounced the growing aggressiveness of the imperialist camp. There was only one logical conclusion to be drawn from his bitter utterances: the Congress had been called upon to reaffirm Russia's drive for world communism, to speed up military preparations (output of heavy industry, armament, including atomic weapons, transport, etc.), and to tighten the iron grip of the government over the Soviet population and the peoples of the satellite states.

"Pravda" immediately sharpened its anti-Western campaign, appealing for more "vigilance and political maturity" on the part of party organisations. "In their mad fury against the peoples of the socialist camp" "Pravda" went on, "the imperialists are excelling themselves in all ways in their hostile, subversive acts against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. . . . When developing peaceful socialist construction, we must not forget for a minute the intrigues of international reaction which is hatching out plans for a new war."

Stalin's Last Public Speech

At the closing session of the Congress on October 5th Stalin made his last appearance and delivered the last public speech in his life. In reply to messages of foreign communist leaders who participated in the Congress deliberations, he clearly exposed the true meaning of the successive Soviet peace-campaigns, giving the final definition of the communist peace-doctrine.

To begin with Stalin stressed that the Russian communist party should help the allied parties abroad in their fight for peace and liberation. . . . There is every reason to count on . . . victory for the brotherly parties in countries under the domination of capitalism. . . . Our party, far from being opposed to the interests of peace-loving peoples, merges with them. . . . The banner of the bourgeois democratic freedom has been thrown overboard. . . . It evolves on representatives of communist and democratic parties to pick up that banner and carry it forward to rally round them the majority of the people.

The most striking part of this speech dealt with the support given to the Soviet Union by foreign communists in 1918-19. Stalin affirmed that all support given to Russia and all the struggle against the intervention

June, 1953

of the capitalist powers was but a struggle for preservation of peace and the true interests of the peoples concerned.

Stalin's insistence on the inevitability of eventual wars among capitalist states thoroughly deprived this peculiar peace-doctrine of any pacifist flavour. Communist victory is being represented as the achievement of a just and lasting peace and struggle for peace means practically a relentless fight of all communist parties under the leadership of the Kremlin for the implementation of a communist world-order.

The Stalinist political strategy applied in the late thirties the same doctrine and accordingly Hitler's aggression against Poland in 1939 was encouraged by the notorious Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, which precipitated the outbreak of the second world-war.

In conclusion the debates and resolutions of the XIXth Congress substantiated the probability of reinforcing and widening the cold-war and multiplying its hot spots, bringing thus nearer the danger of a third world-war.

At the fall of 1952 the party and state apparatus had been practically streamlined for war emergency, the satellite bloc and in particular its armed forces became more integrated, the intimate cooperation with Red China strengthened and Cominform activities intensified. A tense atmosphere of expectation and singular nervousness prevailed in Moscow and in the main Red capitals.

Then, on March 6th, 1953, the news of Stalin's death resounded like a thunderbolt. Could Stalinism survive Stalin?—was the first thought of millions behind the iron curtain. Would a new dictator emerge immediately or would the regime be henceforth governed by a group of party and military leaders?

Without any delay official announcements made it clear that the Kremlin bosses had not been taken by surprise. They had worked out in time a well-balanced scheme of party, state and military authorities. Malenkov succeeded Stalin solely as premier. Khrushchev asserted his position inside the party-machine and Beria behind the scenes. Anybody acquainted with the peculiar forms in which political changes manifest themselves in the Soviet system, could guess that a triumvirate, Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, had officially replaced the one-man leadership. At the same time, however, the Politburo had been revived. In this set-up Beria is certainly the strong hand. One could easily guess that the real policy framing business is being worked out in this collective body. We find here again Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovitch, Shaburov, Pevukin and Mikoyan. Several of these men reappear as leading governmental figures. Marshal Voroshilov replaced

Shvernik as president of the Supreme Soviet (head of the state). Besides the war minister, Marshal Bulganin, who is also at present a very strong political influence, three other outstanding war-time military-leaders, Marshal G. Zhukov, Marshal Vassilevsky, both deputy-war ministers, and Marshal V. Sokolovsky as chief of the general staff, are closely associated with the government.

Responsibility Of Premiership

Malenkov shares the responsibility of premiership with four deputy-premiers: Molotov (foreign minister), Beria (minister for interior), Marshal Bulganin and Kaganovitch, the only surviving Jew among Soviet leaders. Not less important is the ten-men secretariat of the Central Committee of the party headed by Nikita Khrushchev as secretary general and Stalin's successor in this powerful position. Among the other members: Aristov, Brezhnev, Mikhailov, Pegov, Ponamarenko, Suslov and Ignatiev. The latter had been already purged which indicates that the ruling team might be only a temporary one. The release of 15 doctors (6 Jews) who had been the victims of false accusations on the part of officials of the former ministry of state-security in connection with anti-Jewish measures taken in the last Stalinist period marked the start of new tactics.

A communique issued by Beria (April 5) disclosed this fateful change of the successors. What had happened? In the depths of the ministry of state-security were fabricated provocations whose victims were honest Soviet people. "This had occurred because the leader of the former ministry of state-security fell down on the job. Former minister of state-security Ignatiev manifested political blindness and gullibility and turned out to be led around by such criminal adventurers as former deputy minister Ryumin, the chief of the investigatory section" (quoted from "Pravda"). The arrest and the announced trial of high officials of the former security-board were perhaps the most important moves decided upon by the new government. The release of the doctors was obviously intended to lessen the internal tension and to placate the masses which feared that after Stalin's death his successors might proceed with bloody purges. On the other hand this decision had to demonstrate to the outside world that Malenkov's regime repudiates any anti-Semitic trends which had provoked indignation abroad and occasioned the break-up of diplomatic relations with Israel. This move had been carefully synchronized with the new peace offensive which had been launched by Malenkov, Beria and Molotov in their orations on Stalin's funeral and finally culminated in statements on the possibility of a peaceful co-existence of

June, 1953

communist and capitalist states and the settlement of all controversial issues by peaceful means.

It would be a grave mistake to assume that the risk of war by communist aggression has receded because of these peaceful affirmations and a series of conciliatory Soviet gestures.

Malenkov's government is bound to stick to the global strategy solemnly approved by the last Congress. If it would deviate from the Congress program, the Soviet leadership of the whole Red bloc could probably disintegrate. Controversial communist factions would favour Titoist developments anywhere. However, the Moscow time-table of expansionist endeavours has been overthrown by the tremendous shock of Stalin's disappearance. The new leadership needs badly time for consolidation. It needs more than a short breathing spell. 1953 will be a highly critical year for the odd assorted Malenkov team which might be soon replaced by another type of dictatorship. It is extremely doubtful whether Molotov, who was known to advocate under Stalin a rash and harsh policy against the West, actually aims at concluding definite agreements on other issues than a Korean armistice. Neither he nor Vishinsky can be trusted in their phoney role of passionate peace-makers. When, on the eve of the second world-war, Litvinov made his flaming speeches on the indivisibility of peace, the true Soviet-policy makers were busy preparing a pact with the main potential aggressor—Nazi Germany—and had already decided upon neutrality in the approaching war among non-communist states. This should be remembered at a time when new appeasement trends flourish again on our side of the Iron Curtain and many democratic statesmen are only too eager to meet Soviet negotiators half-way. Moreover, public opinion should be aware that any mistakes in the appreciation of true Soviet aims might put the West on the wrong track. Peace must yet be won. It might be lost by the West's lack of initiative. A realistic approach to the Kremlin's peace feelers commands the continuation of defence preparations and other security measures.

Kenya And The Mau Mau

W. E. H. Stanner

THE depredations of the Mau Mau, the Kikuyu terrorist uprising, continue to arouse disquiet over the future of British colonialism in Kenya. The situation between October and March was described as one of "emergency" and, after April, as "resembling war". At the time of writing (May) the troubles were by no means under control, and there seemed reason to believe that the full crisis had yet to come. Assaults, outrages and murders continued to occur and, if the lives of the European settlers seemed a little more secure as a result of the Government's protective measures, the danger to loyalist Kikuyu was unabated. The repeated mass-arrests of Kikuyu in and around the capital, Nairobi, seemed to indicate that the whole situation could deteriorate quickly.

A great deal more is afoot in Kenya than the Mau Mau insurrection. There are, actually, four different, though connected, crises occurring at the same time. Unless at least the outlines of the other crises are understood, the significance of the Mau Mau is itself difficult to grasp. And the other crises cannot be fully understood unless something is known of the peculiarly tangled racial, economic and political history of the Colony.

The precise meaning of the term *Mau Mau* is unknown. It obviously has a symbolic significance of some kind. A revolt, using the same kind of symbol, broke out in Southern Tanganyika about fifty years ago. It was known by the KiSwahili term for "water", *maji*, duplicated into "Maji Maji". The Germans, who then had the Protectorate over Tanganyika, put down the Maji Maji with such draconic severity that, to this day, the spirit of the revolting tribes remains broken. The term Mau Mau, like Maji Maji, is no doubt linked in some way with mystical beliefs held by at least some of the native insurgents, and used as a rally by the leaders. One of these beliefs is that bullets fired by Europeans will turn to water, and that Africans who join the revolution will pass unscathed through any fighting. Here, as elsewhere, the symbol gives men a token of clarity, confidence and courage on a path of danger.

The Mau Mau is still mainly confined to one tribe, the Kikuyu, whereas the Maji Maji was widely inter-tribal. The strength of the Mau Mau

June, 1953

does not seem to be known with any certainty, for the obvious reason that its members are bound by an oath of secrecy. One early "informed" estimate put the membership at 10 per cent of the tribe, who number more than 1 million and are thus one of the largest tribes in Kenya. Another put it at 20 per cent. More recently, it has been said that nine from every ten Kikuyu are in some way involved. Whether the figure is 100,000 or 900,000 the uprising is obviously of very serious proportions, by far the worst affair of its kind in Kenya's history.

The Kenya Government has been obliged to set in motion protective and offensive measures on a scale not yet fully realized abroad. Although, evidently, only a few thousand Kikuyu—a very small minority of those who may have taken the oath—are actually carrying out acts of violence, the total forces set in motion by the Government are approaching 45,000. In March, there were at least 3,500 regular troops in the field (about a brigade), and some artillery units were recently sent to the Colony. The active police, both regulars and reservists, numbered about 30,000. There were, in addition, some 6,600 European home guards and a loyal force of Kikuyu home guards numbering 6,000.

Murder, Arson And Terrorism

The ostensible object of the Mau Mau is to drive the Europeans out of Kenya by murder, arson and terrorism. But the underlying motive is clearly deeper, for the terrorists are also striking at their fellow-tribesmen and, in a few cases, at Indian settlers as well. The death-roll now runs into hundreds, including a score or more Europeans. What is particularly revealing, in that it shows the Mau Mau to be far from merely a violent demonstration against Europeans only, is the large number of Kikuyu who have been assassinated. These include some of the most distinguished African officials in Kenya—men in whom the Government, the European settlers and thousands of other Kikuyu have reposed confidence and responsibility. Large numbers of petty officials, both in the employ of the Kenya Government and in the employ of the Kikuyu Local Government, have been attacked and, more recently, ordinary African citizens who sided with the forces of law and order. The Mau Mau is thus dividing the Kikuyu tribe against itself. In spirit, it is recidivist towards the Africa of paganism and barbarism, and seems bent on forcing this kind of option on a tribe which, for half a century, has been regarded as one of the most progressive in Kenya.

There is reason to believe that the Mau Mau will not rest content with ambush, murder and political incitement, but will extend its operations to sabotage and to the fomenting of industrial unrest. The slums

of Nairobi are points of great weakness, for it is there that the landless, leaderless and more desperate of the detribalized Africans tend to congregate. The mass arrests and screenings which the Government has felt compelled to undertake in the overcrowded African suburbs reveal the uneasiness which is felt.

Until recently, the Mau Mau seemed to be a "movement" rather than, as yet, an "organization". That is, it did not seem to have any internal "structure", any disciplined and systematic chain of command, or any administrative framework for the co-ordination of its actions. Its tactics were stealthy, hit-and-run raids at isolated places over the face of a wide countryside. However, in recent weeks, there seems to have been a noticeably stronger element of organization and planning. A "movement" is, of course, harder to kill than an "organization", but it by no means follows that, if any organization which is now emerging is broken up, the forces underlying the Mau Mau will themselves prove as easy to arrest. Bullets are of very little use against thoughts and sentiments, and the very severity of the repressive measures ensure a troublesome sequel. The Commissioner of Police claimed recently that, by the arrest of Jomo Kenyatta and other leading Kikuyu, the Mau Mau had not only been "decapitated" but had been "cut off at the shoulders", and had thus been more or less scotched although, as he admitted, "the body had begun to wriggle—and wriggle very violently". One is not wholly reassured by recent events that the Commissioner was not being over-optimistic.

The Mau Mau struck suddenly and without warning, but it would be wrong to think of it as having come like a bolt from the blue in an otherwise peaceful colony. Twenty years ago, Kenya was described by someone who knew it well as already "a vast manufactory of sedition"¹. It has been inherently explosive for 30 years. The Kikuyu tribe has always been at the centre of the unrest.

Over the years, the organization of African political pressure groups in Kenya has been persistent and steady. The Kikuyu have always been the leaders. In the 1930's a body known as the Kikuyu Central Association (an unconcealed pressure group) was extremely active, and came into sharp conflict with the authorities. At this time, the control was perhaps needlessly rigid. During and after the war, the Kenya African Union (a trade union) became very powerful, although neighbour tribes of the Kikuyu remained disinterested. Kenyatta was actively associated with both organizations. The actual links between them, and other similar organizations, and the Mau Mau, are blurred. One has perhaps three choices in identifying the return of the Mau Mau. One is to regard it

1. Norman Leys, "A Last Chance in Kenya", 1931, p. 167.

June, 1953

as, in substance, the organized revolutionary wing of a quasi-political movement with a long history of unsuccessful non-violent agitation. The second (and less probable) is as a somewhat unexpected flare up of violence without (at least at first) any real organization, among the most intractable and confused sections of a tribe harassed by a crisis of modernization. The third choice lies somewhere in between. It may be that a movement, at first amorphous, has subsequently been captured by able leaders. Tactically, of course, the uprising has been very successful in "softening" the opposition which might otherwise have greeted the expanding demands of the Kikuyu, but it is a little difficult to believe that African political strategy is as prescient as yet.

Jomo Kenyatta, the convicted leader of the Mau Mau, has stoutly denied that it is part and parcel of the Kenya Africa Union. Whatever the links, if any, with this or other "political" bodies, the purely organizational aspects are, in one sense, of secondary importance. The broad picture of the Mau Mau is that of a violently spasmodic counter-movement against all that stands for, or with, the "civilizing" of Africa. We can see this, I think, fairly plainly, in the discriminate savagery of the Mau Mau methods.

Dark, Ancient Superstition

Mr. Oliver Lyttelton was, I believe, not unjustified in describing some aspects of the Mau Mau as "an unholy union of dark and ancient superstition with the apparatus of modern gangsterism". Superstition there certainly is: the secret oath required of members uses all the well-known forms of African witchcraft. And some of the members are simply common thugs, the undisciplined younger Kikuyu who for years have been the despair of their own elders, and have become a kind of rabble proletariat. The leadership remains somewhat mysterious, but at the Kapenguria trial, the prosecution produced some very interesting evidence of efforts to establish Kenyatta as a religious saviour, e.g. Kikuyu hymn-books in which the name "Jomo" was substituted for Jesus, and "European" was substituted for the "devil". The suggestion was that Kenyatta is trying to develop the "great leader" myth with which we are all too familiar from recent European history. East Africa might easily produce the forerunner of a modern Prester John.

There is no prospect that the Mau Mau can succeed in its object of directly driving the Europeans out of the Colony. Even under the worst assumptions, that is, even if by mistakes on the European side, or by some unforeseeable intervention on the African side, the whole force of the 1 million Kikuyu should be turned, in open rebellion, against the

Kenya Government, the risk still seems remote. If the European position in Kenya were in real danger, neither the Rhodesians nor the Union of South Africa could, or would, remain indifferent. In the worst eventuality, the Kenya settlers would appeal for, and would assuredly obtain, military aid from the south. It may be as well if Australians understand that, throughout Africa, British settlers have a rock-like determination to stay in Africa. I speak with every necessary caution when I say that it is not impossible that, some day, Australia might have to decide a course of action in response to a direct appeal for help. I have found widely in British Africa a belief that Australian understanding and help can be counted on.

The second "crisis" is the long drawn-out trial of Jomo Kenyatta, one of the outstanding Kikuyu, on a charge of active complicity with the Mau Mau. The prosecution sought to show that Kenyatta was the mainspring—indeed, as suggested, it was sought to show that his aim, through the Mau Mau, had been to set himself up as an object of almost religious worship. The charge, and the suggestions, Kenyatta not only denied, but ridiculed. He claimed that the Mau Mau was an independent movement of grievance and indignation; that he had always sought to restrain the Kikuyu from violence; and that by its policy of mass arrests the Government had placed behind bars the only Kikuyu who could keep the tribe at peace. In this, he appeared to admit more than he may have intended.

The complexities hanging on the trial are many and disturbing. Both the Imperial and the Kenya Governments, until recently, were dilatory in addressing themselves, with application and a sense of urgency, to some very real problems facing the Kikuyu. Now, the Kikuyu are not angels; nor are they, I think, a very badly treated tribe; they have problems, but they have been, in many ways, their own worst enemies; and some of their leaders are "politicians" in the worst sense of that term. The trial and appeal rest on certain kinds of evidential fact, touching the issue of statutory crime, but not the tangled issues of social justice about which, rightly or wrongly, many Africans feel a burning sense of grievance. One thus witnesses a kind of play within a play. In hindsight, future generations may well see in these events a turning point of the destiny of Europeans in East Africa. The law proceeds with speed, precision and finality. The exploration and rectification of grievance proceed with maddening slowness, uncertainty and inconclusiveness. An African leader emerges, falls foul of the law, and brings down upon himself a weight of skill, attention and intelligence one half of which, concentrated on, the grievances he represents, might have averted the crisis the law itself precipitates. Whatever the judicial decision, it is likely to be politically

June, 1953

disastrous, unless it is accompanied by the most skilful statesmanship, and the proper time for statesmanship was long before the trial. It is rarely possible even for the best statesmanship to recover ground once lost. The tragedy is that the immediate issues of "justice", as the Kikuyu see them, need not have been forced, in symbolic terms, to a Procrustean bed of law.

Kenyatta's Five-point Demand

Only a few years ago, Kenyatta formulated a five-point demand on behalf of the Kikuyu. He asked for a rectification of their land-grievances, the expansion of social services, a large programme of education, the granting of full civil liberties, and a direct share in government. All might well have been given a sympathetic and public inquiry. The conviction of Kenyatta, whatever the issue of law, can seem, under African conditions, too much like the denial of "justice". It is from this process that the accredited martyr emerges. The Kikuyu "demands", in point of fact, were not all well based, were in some ways unjustifiable, but all were worth dispassionate inquiry. For one reason or another, such an inquiry has gone altogether too tardily in Kenya.

In all colonies the principle of direct action is now well understood. The Kenya Africans have not overlooked, and have not failed to draw the moral from the events which have taken place in recent years in the Gold Coast, Nigeria, North Africa, the Sudan, South Africa, India and Malaya. Many Africans feel a great passion in their "struggle", and see a great glamour in its outcome. Many of their leaders are prepared to test themselves in the fire of events. They do not respond to "preaching from a schema of middle-class values that knows no glamour and no passion". I remember, in Samoa in 1947, when the Samoans were about to appeal for self-government to the United Nations, over the head of New Zealand, how one chief said simply: "There is no tomorrow, only today. This is the hour." It was no less a person than that monument of Victorian moralism, Mr. Gladstone, who said: "I am sorry to say that if no instructions had been addressed in political crises to the people of this country except to remember to hate violence, to love order, and to exercise patience, the liberties of this country would never have been attained." The next phase of the immediate crisis rests, I believe, on the outcome of the second crisis, the appeal against the conviction of Jomo Kenyatta.

I knew Kenyatta fairly well when we were fellow students in Malinowski's seminar at the London School of Economics before the war. I thought him an astute, able, ambitious man with a strong and

determined personality. He seemed to understand the British thoroughly, especially the kind of appeals to which they respond. He did not seem to dislike British culture. Indeed, he thought Africans had much to gain from it. But he hated the kind of "colonialism" that had developed in Kenya. And that brings me to the third crisis.

The onset of the Mau Mau precipitated a renewal of an effort by the European settlers to free themselves from Crown Colony Government. This is not a new demand. It is, in fact, the perpetual "crisis" of Kenya. Since 1920, one issue after another has arisen around the theme of self-government: and, until very recently, the demand has always been, in substance, for the same thing—the political, social and economic paramourcy of Europeans over Indians and Africans.

The Imperial Government, from 1905 on, refused to allow any kind of *legal* restrictions to be placed on the non-European groups, but it condoned the imposition of many important administrative restrictions, so that wide inroads were made into the nominal official policy of equal rights and opportunities for all races. After the early 1930's, the settlers, realizing the lack of sympathy abroad, called a halt in their early campaign, which had been extremely intransigent. Their voice, however, remained very powerful on the Executive Council; they still dreamed of replacing the official majority on the Legislative Council by an unofficial elected majority of Europeans; they still hoped to reserve the White Highlands for Europeans in perpetuity; and the more influential leaders had an undiminished ambition to form a regional Federation with Uganda and Tanganyika, with Kenya dominating the Federation and, in time, of linking with the Rhodesias and Nyasaland to form a British East-Centred African Dominion stretching from the Limpopo to the Nile. The Imperial Government would never give its support to this dream. It felt that, on the facts of record, the interests of millions of Africans could not be entrusted to a small white minority. After 1931, the settlers, though still restive, became more careful and diplomatic in their policy statements. From that year, the Imperial Government imposed a "constitutional halt", or, as some of the settlers said, "drew the strangulating chains of Whitehall tighter".

British Leadership Irreplaceable

It is all too easy, from abroad, to misjudge Kenya and its settlers. The ultimate vision of an East-Central-African Dominion is one which, I admit frankly, I also share. Much of the advocacy, and many particular episodes in Kenya's history, have been, in my opinion, deeply mistaken, but I am unshaken in my belief that British culture, leadership and settlement in Africa are irreplaceable. And, in judging issues of the

June, 1953

day, one has to remember that all social problems have a history, that when you know the history many unreasonable things come to seem less unreasonable, and that the aggregate effects of the most innocent and praiseworthy things that people do at any time can take on, later, dismaying shapes. It is unwise to judge the future of, say, 20th Century African Federation by the record of 19th Century or early 20th Century colonialism.

Kenya, as a Colony, is younger even than New Guinea. It has crammed into a period shorter than the period of Australian Federation an extraordinary range of physical and moral achievement. Of course, there are bad spots. The Kenya settlers of 1953 feel, however, much the kind of irritation that Australians feel at, say, foreign criticism of the political, legal and economic tangles which we now have as the unplanned outcome of Federalism in a dynamic Australia. In Kenya, as in Australia, many current problems are substantially the work of men and groups now dead, because of ideas and ideals now changed. The Kenya settlers, like Australians, have to do what they can about problems which leave them little room to manoeuvre. What nation is unfamiliar with this situation?

Before the 1880's, East Africa was still substantially part of "darkest Africa", in spite of the work of such adventurers as Rebmann, Krapf, Livingstone, Burton, Speke, Grant, Baker, Stanley and others, whose marvellous tales fired the imagination of the world, and made it marvel, more than anything since the discovery of Australia. The "scramble" for Africa came to an end with the Treaty of Berlin in 1885. Germany, Portugal and Britain divided the whole zone between them. In 1888, the administrative responsibility over what is now Kenya and the then independent native kingdom of Uganda, 800 miles inland, was given to the Imperial British East Africa Company, a Chartered Company. The next year Germany proclaimed a protectorate over the neighbouring territory, Tanganyika. The task proved beyond the Chartered Company and, in any case, a further extension and solidification of British rule were made necessary by two other factors. Affairs in Uganda, under the barbarous King Mutesa, fell into anarchy. Bishop Hannington and other missionaries were murdered, and Christian converts from paganism were butchered in circumstances which shocked liberal England, and led to a tremendous agitation. Secondly, a slave trade of very large proportions still persisted and, under the Brussels Convention of 1890, Britain agreed with Germany to wipe it out finally in East Africa.

The Foreign Office took over from the Chartered Company in 1893. In 1896, a railway (the main instrument to control the slave trade) was started from Mombasa to Lake Victoria (587 miles), and was pushed

through, in unbelievably difficult circumstances, by 1902. The two protectorates, Uganda and British East Africa, date from that year. The control passed from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office in 1905.

From the 1880's on there was no particularly clear line of British policy for East Africa. Neither "liberal" Imperialism nor the new "Imperialism" of Joseph Chamberlain had much effect at first. Things just grew. Between 1900 and 1914 some fundamental trends set in and, in my understanding, part of the present basis of Kenya's troubles was then laid down. Until then, Kenya was neither a colony of exploitation nor a colony of settlement.

The Imperial Government, understandably enough, sought to induce European settlers to come in and help to pacify and consolidate a wild, primitive area. Under local influences, this trend developed into an effort to establish what in time emerged as an aristocracy of European landowners. At the time, the idea went almost unchallenged since it was formulated only slowly. Between 1902 and 1915, about 6,000 square miles of land were alienated, some of it native-owned. Because of obscure law, some dubious transactions, and a great deal of short-sightedness (duplicated in almost every new country), Kenya's development was fixed on a pattern of almost certain eventual trouble. By 1921, there were 9,600 Europeans in Kenya. About 2,000 of them were landowners and about 10,000 square miles of first-class land was in their hands as freehold or leasehold.

In the 1920's and 1930's the "modern" Kenya emerged. It existed before its "shape" was at all clearly understood. It may be summed up under four main points. First, a "plural" racial community of three main racial blocs—Europeans, Indians and Africans, with the margin of organized political and economic power securely in the hands of a privileged European minority. Secondly, a strained and artificial economy, making free use of many arbitrary devices to bolster itself up even at the cost of great racial inequality. Thirdly, a growing Indian and African population, experimenting with "pressure" organizations, but still peaceful and reasonably co-operative. Fourthly, a typical Crown Colony Government, that is, one trying, by the use of an official majority of Executive and Legislative Councillors, to steer a middle course between the demands of local unequally represented power-groups and restraints imposed by the Imperial Government.

Much in this shorthand account needs emphasis, explanation, qualification and analysis which I cannot give. I have placed the stress where I believe it should lie, that is, on the desire of, and constant effort by, the Kenya settlers to free themselves from Crown Colony Government, and to take charge of their own destiny.

June, 1953

Vast Inflation, Shortages

I cannot describe political events during and after the war. After 1946, the Colony's economy ran away. All the things the outside world experienced—a vast inflation, shortages, a wild spree of “planning” (mostly on paper), intellectual intoxication, and general over-committal—Kenya also experienced. European immigration was deliberately increased, so that by 1948 there were nearly 30,000 Europeans there. The Indian population shot up to nearly 100,000, and a further 100,000 were held back only by administrative devices. The tension, excitement, and (it often seemed) directionless activity of Kenya in 1945-9 were a study in themselves. Few people had time to do any real thinking, but some solid gains emerged nevertheless.

There might well have been a renewed burst of political agitation by Europeans after the war had it not been for the realization that important changes were pending in the form of Government, and in the whole conception of its task. Ultimately, the Executive Council (on which settlers' opinions remained strongly represented) became a kind of “Cabinet”, each member being put in charge of a department or group of departments. The Legislative Council was reconstructed to give it, at long last, an unofficial majority.² Mr. Eliud Mathu, a leading Kikuyu, was appointed to the Executive Council, thus bringing Africans into touch with the highest level of policy formation. There were also some extremely valuable reorganizations of the African local authority system, by which tribal authorities were given control of their own funds and wider powers. In 1951, there was an all-races' agreement to hold a round-table convention to consider future changes in the constitution. This, for Kenya, was a positive *tour de force*, achieved by local goodwill and by the Secretary of State, Mr. Griffiths, in the Attlee Ministry. The constitutional inquiry proceeded, however, with exasperating slowness, and was overtaken by the Mau Mau outbreak. Then last September, a Royal Commission on land-use (the greatest single headache in the Colony) was announced, but the completion of its membership and the start of work again went with painful slowness. Its work, which must be very protracted, may well be overshadowed by the inevitable Royal Commission to inquire into the Mau Mau. Meanwhile, the virtual completion of the plans for a Central African Federation will probably have the effect of re-awakening the same ambitions in Kenya. All this brings me to the fourth “crisis”.

2. (Governor as President, Vice-President and Speaker, 7 ex-officio members of Executive Council, 9 nominated official members, 1 Arab elected member, 11 elected European members, 5 Indian elected members, 4 nominated unofficials to represent the African community, and 1 nominated unofficial member to represent the Arab community.)

The March Of Objective Conditions

I am conscious of overworking the term "crisis" but, when one deals with situations of high social mobility, it is well to remember that there are limits to the intensity and spread of change which a society can sustain without crisis. The life of an under-developed area subjected (as is Kenya) to an intense drive for "development" is, in a sense, one long crisis. In Kenya, you can see a score of breaking-points of strain. Consider the situation, and the forces expressed in heavy capital investment, inflation, crime, intensive education, soil erosion, propaganda, land hunger, and so forth, all registering their effects on a strained and lop-sided economy in which bad race relations, industrial unrest and political jealousies are among the hard realities of life. The trend of such objective conditions is unmistakably towards an accumulating strain. Kenya simply shares this condition with many other dependent territories.

The land situation is crucial to the whole situation. Let me make one point clearly: this is not simply, or essentially, a matter of the dispossession of Africans by Europeans. Kenya is about two-thirds the size of New South Wales, with nearly three times its population. Three-fifths of Kenya is arid, semi-desert, nearly valueless for human use. Almost all the north and east supports only nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes, who graze herds of cattle on hot, dreary wastes. The south has consequently an intense pressure of population and cattle on land. In this southern section there are a narrow, fertile coastal strip, and an inland plateau with a mean elevation of about 5,000 feet and a range from 3,000 to 10,000 feet. The plateau is cut in half by the Great Rift Valley, a huge trough, 2,000 to 3,000 feet below the surrounding plateau level. The landscape is tremendously impressive. The climate on many parts of the plateau is exhilarating—at Nairobi, for example, the mean maximum and minimum are 78° and 57°. The soil is very fertile. This zone is the natural locus of settlement, development, and trouble. The logic of human ecology, as well as of politics, make Kikuyuland dead centre.

Kenya's total population is now nearly 5.5 millions. It has probably doubled in the last 25 years. All but about 155,000 are Africans. The ratio of Africans to non-Africans is about 300:1. This tremendous disparity is heightened if you compare it with the way in which land is distributed. Two-thirds of the non-European population are Indians (about 100,000). One-fifth only are Europeans (about 30,000), mainly British. The remainder are Goans, Arabs and others. The Europeans sit on the apex of this pyramid, at the peak of the power-structure, at the top of the status-ladder, and at the centre of the economic and capital structure of the Colony. And they have an enormously disproportionate share of the land.

June, 1953

As I remarked earlier, 115,000 square miles of Kenya's 225,000 sq. m. can be ruled out as almost useless. Another 45,000 sq. m. can be dismissed on various grounds as unavailable for economic use. The remaining 65,000 sq. m. is divided largely between Africans and aliens, but whereas over 5 million Africans live on about 52,000 sq. m., the remaining 12,500 sq. m. is in the possession of, or is available to, the aliens. Not much land is in the possession of non-European aliens, and only a small minority of the Europeans are landholders on any scale. the kind of figures—I do not claim these are completely accurate, but they bring out the order of magnitude—we should keep in mind are, say, 3,000 European landholders holding, or having access to, 12,500 sq. m., and 5 million Africans holding or having access to 52,000 sq. m. The rough per capita averages for the whole population brings out the disparity sharply—in very crude terms, the European has one-third of a sq. m. while the African has one-hundredth of a sq. m.

This sounds bad enough: but the reality among actual land-users is worse. The Kikuyu look out every day on European farms of hundreds or thousands of acres, much of it, often for no clear reason, not in productive use. The comparison, even if justifiable by sound economic reasons, are hard for land-hungry men to accept quietly. A Kikuyu is lucky if he has five or six acres to live on. Many have far less and, worse, it is often an aggregate-holding made up of anything from 3 or 4 to 25 or 30 tiny strips, each one miles, maybe, from the others. Europeans are not even indirectly responsible for this situation. As in India, it is the outcome of bad farming ("shifting cultivation") and the fragmentation and parcellation of land by the Kikuyu laws of inheritance. The land troubles of this kind are at their worst in places like Fort Hall, Kiamba and Nyeri where, by and large, the Mau Mau outrages have also been worst.

The plain truth of the matter, however, is that although the Kikuyu have too little land, to grant more land, by carving it out of European, Crown reserve, or other tribal holdings, is no solution, even if it were practicable. With increasing population, there will continue to be insufficient land, even if African methods of land-use are greatly improved. The Colony can only remain, for such reasons, a turbulent area. It is often supposed abroad that the Kenya Government has done little to avert such conditions. This is not only untrue, but extremely unfair. Over the last fifteen years an enormous amount of time and effort have been put into Governmental schemes to conserve and reclaim land, to improve farm methods, and to rationalize land inheritance. The supposition that land-reform is a simple matter, and that native peasantries will

invariably assist in measures for their own benefit, is very wide of the truth. In Kenya, progress has been real, but slow, too slow perhaps for the accumulating strains of other kinds.

Such are the four kinds of "crisis" running concurrently. The great risk is that something will happen that will make them coalesce in a qualitatively new kind of disturbance.

The Future Of The Mau Mau

I do not think anyone is in a position to predict the future of the Mau Mau. Provided no foolish errors are made, and provided no external influence is exerted, it can probably be kept within bounds. There are two main reasons for this. First, the Kikuyu are not liked—indeed, are actively disliked—by their African neighbours, particularly by the Masai, the Wakamba, and the Lacustrine tribes. Some tribes in the Nyanza province have asked to be transferred from Kenya to Uganda in order, among other reasons, to escape from the political and economic pressure of the Kikuyu! Secondly, the Kikuyu are themselves deeply divided internally. Kenyatta is not, as yet, universally recognised or respected as a leader, though there seems little doubt that he is trying to establish himself as the head of the whole Kikuyu people.

Some inherently dangerous moves have already been made in the offensive against the Mau Mau. One of these is the collective punishment of whole settlements or villages for offences committed in an area. Collective punishment is sometimes unavoidable, but most experienced administrators wisely shrink from it except as a weapon of absolute last resort. It is a crude example of *lex talionis* at its worst, and has no place in a modern juridical code. By punishing the innocent along with the guilty it may inflict great personal injustice and can speedily embitter a whole countryside. It is a weapon which probably never pays, since it leaves a trail of resentments which complicate the problems of civil government when the emergency is over. It is a flagrant contradiction of the whole spirit of British law. By falling back upon it in some emergency and, in so doing, violating our own principles, we undercut the moral basis of our administration, which has been to try to substitute something better for the more primitive juridical systems of native peoples, which usually (as in Kenya) are based implicitly on the notion of collective responsibility. Secondly, even when collective punishment is used as "a weapon of last resort", that is usually precisely what it is not. One often finds that alternative measures have not been fully explored. The deeper causes of the disturbance may have been only superficially studied. I

June, 1953

will not say it should never be used, in any circumstances, for absolute rules of this kind cannot be laid down, but whenever it is used, whatever the circumstances, there should be a later inquiry by Royal Commission.

The second dangerous move made in Kenya is the confiscation of cattle. In East Africa, cattle are dynamite. They have not only a high economic value, but a symbolic, almost a sacred, value which Europeans find it hard to understand. Just before the war, when the Kamba Machakos reserve was crowded to the point of ruin by over-stocking, a compulsory culling of herds was ordered by the Government, which was at its wits' end to know how to stop the Kamba from ruining themselves. The Kamba rose as one man and forced a modification of the policy. They have never forgotten—or forgiven—the incident. Penal confiscation is even more dangerous. One hopes the decision on this occasion was taken more coolly.

From abroad, no one can really judge the local circumstances, and the merits or demerits of the decisions which have had to be taken. Political intervention from abroad is particularly dangerous. The London "Economist" rightly condemned the Opposition in the House of Commons for moving the adjournment to debate the police action at Kilewara, in opening fire and killing and wounding 33 Africans, in an illegal gathering, after repeated warnings and persuasion had failed to prevent a breach of the peace. The Opposition's action ran the risk of weakening the forces of law and order in Kenya where, at the time, the Mau Mau had killed over 100 Europeans and Africans.

Look On It As Their Home

We Australians, who settled a continent, should be the first to appreciate that the 30,000 Europeans in Kenya look on it as their home as much as we look on Australia as ours. Many of those who are now adults are second-generation Kenya-born. Many adolescents are third-generation Kenya-born. Most of them would fight and die in Kenya rather than go elsewhere. What to do? One sometimes hears it suggested seriously that the best solution is for the Imperial Government to "buy" the settlers out, and return their lands to the Africans. No one who knows in the least what he is talking about can suggest any real gain, to the Africans if the European settlers were to leave. In any case, the notion is illusion, not only because, even if it were practicable, and it is not, there are also 100,000 Indians in Kenya also to "buy out". Both Indians and Europeans, in disagreement on nearly everything else, are at least agreed upon one thing: that, in no circumstances, can they ever be induced to leave. And

the majority of Africans want nothing of the kind. There is no "solution" this way.

Kenya is but one of three contiguous British dependencies in East Africa: the other two are Tanganyika and Uganda. The three, as a group, are about the same size as New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia put together, with about three times the population. They form a customs union, are jointly administered in many important matters by a High Commission, and will probably form some kind of eventual Federation, so that a decisive change in any one is always likely to affect the others. They are of both strategic and economic importance to metropolitan powers. Australians, blissfully unfamiliar with the type of problem which British settlers in Africa live with daily, need to keep a sense of proportion, a sense of hard political reality, and a sense of Commonwealth interests, in judging the present and future of Kenya. We are in no position to indulge easy moral judgments, or to advance the "paper" solution of things we scarcely comprehend from anything in our experience. We have also to consider what our position would be if the African continent were alight from end to end.

The North-West Pacific And The Korean War*

Sir Frederic Eggleston

THE change of administration in the United States makes it advisable to review the policy, which has been pursued largely on the initiative of the two great antagonists in the present world tension in the vital area that I have mentioned. The attack on South Korea occurred in the middle of the term of President Truman. He immediately accepted what he considered to be the challenge, invoked United Nations action, and the subsequent diplomacy and military action has been carried out by his administration. Mr. John Foster Dulles, the new Secretary of State, was, of course, associated with much of President Truman's policy, but the new President is bound to make a close review of the situation, and an assessment of the policy pursued to date is due.

International problems all have their root in history, and the Korean War is a manifestation of the critical situation which has developed in the North-West Pacific over the last two centuries. Political commentators frequently do not recognise the bases of the current moves on which they comment. The march of Russia to the Pacific was bound to create problems, because two very different policies were meeting there. The policy of Imperial Russia was to dominate China, and Japan recognised that if this objective were accomplished, her islands were doomed to fall under Russian sway, so she resisted Russia's advance and defeated her in 1904-5. This did not mean much relief to China, for Japan was nearer and more efficient than Russia. For many years, Russia was in a mood for withdrawal from Far Eastern commitments, and in critical periods she took care to have reinsurance pacts with Japan. This position was, however, revised in the most startling manner just before the end of the great war in the Pacific by the Treaty of Yalta in February, 1945. Roosevelt and Churchill, desiring to ease the situation and minimise the casualties expected in the invasion of Japan, asked for

* First part of Sir Frederic's article which the "Outlook" is publishing in two parts. The second part will appear in the next issue of the "Outlook".

Russian intervention in the Far East, and Stalin agreed to it, on the following conditions, *inter alia*:—

- (a) Russia should be restored to the position in Manchuria she had occupied before the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904.
- (b) The southern half of the island of Sakhalin, which Japan had gained by the treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, was to go back to Russia.
- (c) Russia was also to regain the Kurile Islands, which had been allotted to Japan by a treaty between Japan and Russia in 1870.

Russia came into the Pacific war about a week before Japan surrendered, and for this trifling assistance, the strategic situation in the Far East was completely reversed in Russia's favour. Everybody in the Far East—Japanese and Chinese—recognise that the Power which holds Manchuria can control China. Sakhalin comes within 30 miles of the northern island of Japan, while the Kurile Islands come right into a bay of this island, within 15 miles of the mainland. Whereas before, Japan, by her occupation of the Kurile Islands, could close the Sea of Okhotsk and the approaches of Vladivostock, Russia is now able to control this sea, and keep the Japanese out of it. When North Korea became a Communist satellite, Japan became like a nut in a nut-cracker, and Russia could crush her whenever she wished.

The Treaty of Yalta was kept a secret and Truman knew nothing of it. He found it in a drawer in the White House. If it had been known, it would have been extenuated on the ground that Japan was an enemy, and Russia's help in crushing her was part of war strategy. But wise diplomacy is always seeking a balance in the power complex. At that time, those who knew about the Treaty were nervous about China, which had been delivered into Russian hands. Russian intentions appeared to be to realise Tsarist Imperial policy. Soon after Yalta, it became evident that Russia was determined to extend her power on all sides, and that wartime alliances were not to be allowed to deter her. The tension between East and West is now obvious, and so far as the Far East is concerned, the West came into this struggle to meet an antagonist whose strength has been multiplied manyfold. When the Chinese Communists, acknowledging the lead of, and association with Russia, defeated the Chinese Nationalists, further immense accretions to Russian strength occurred in the Communist bloc.

The Yalta agreement contemplated the restoration of Russian railway rights in Manchuria, and her occupation of Port Arthur and Dairen. These rights had always been subject to Chinese sovereignty and protected by a series of agreements, which, in fact, very imperfectly safeguarded Chinese

June, 1953

rights. In August, 1945, a new series of agreements between Russia and China were negotiated, very much on the lines of the old agreements, but in crucial matters, the implementations of these agreements depended on further statutes, as they were called, and these were never completed. When the Communist Republic was established in 1949, one of the first steps of the new Government was to negotiate a treaty of friendship with Russia, by which the return of the railways to Chinese hands within two years was promised. Port Arthur was to be jointly occupied as a Naval base within that period, while Dairen was to be the subject of further negotiations. This agreement was obviously dressed up to look like a concession to an ally, but the performance of it was postponed when the Chinese Prime Minister went to Moscow late in 1952.

Up to 1950, most people outside America were regarded as unduly suspicious when they suggested that the Russians were hostile, and were scheming for world dominion, and still more suspicious if they said that China and Russia were in association in such a policy. There are undoubtedly many statements of Mao Tse Tung and Liu Shiao Ghi, which call for world revolution or revolt of colonial peoples in Asia, and the Chinese radio has poured out a continual tirade of abuse from the commencement of General Marshall's attempts at conciliation between the Nationalists and Communists in China. At the same time, the Moscow radio played a similar note of abuse of the United States. Communism is a creed which cannot flourish unless it has an object of hatred, and the nation which was most capitalistic in organisation and least socialistic in temper is inevitably the object for the campaign of abuse. The Chinese Communists knew that the Americans had done more for China than any other nation, they had studied Chinese problems more deeply and had more likely solutions than anyone else. It was important to erase from the minds of the Chinese people these facts. Both Roosevelt and Truman had done their best to conciliate the Kuo Mintang and the Communist party, and their action was represented as antagonistic to China.

Nevertheless, up to 1950, it cannot be said that the Western world had done anything to counter the rapidly advancing Communist front, except the steps taken to prevent the success of the blockade of Berlin in 1948. It may be said, indeed, that this was a testing by Russia of the temper of the West, and their willingness for resistance. In the same way, the invasion of South Korea by North Korea might be said to be a probe by Russia, somewhat of the same type, to test the willingness of the West to resist further advances in Asia. It was somewhat more determined than that of Berlin, because, if successful, it would have practically completed the encirclement of Japan, which was thought to

be necessary if a general advance in Asia was to be commenced. The commencement of the present phase of international tension in the Pacific came when the challenge of Korea was immediately taken up.

I am not going, in this essay, to discuss in any detail the origin of the Korean struggle, nor the propriety of the action taken by U.N. in the terms of the Charter, nor the way in which the war has been conducted. What I am more concerned in is the repercussions of this war and the effects it has had on the relations of the various countries involved, especially China and Japan, and the evaluation of the diplomacy it has produced.

My conclusions as to the incident may be summarised as follows:—

- (1) The attack on South Korea was unprovoked aggression.
- (2) It was done with the connivance of Russia, and almost certainly planned and directed by Russian officers. (See U.N. Bulletin, June 15, 1951.)
- (3) It was done with the knowledge of China. The use of Manchurian bases was always contemplated, and there is evidence that Chinese help was promised. (See Pacific Affairs, Dec., 1950.)
- (4) Chinese armies were mobilised in Manchuria, ready to intervene, and did intervene early in October.
- (5) The case for U.N. action is thus clear. Russia did not concur in the action, but she was wilfully absent from the Council, and though this might be held to make U.N. action illegitimate, Russia has never asserted this view on decisions by the Council on similar majorities.
- (6) Differences of opinion may arise as to the conduct of the campaign. I think a campaign on behalf of the United Nations should be conducted on somewhat similar lines to an ordinary war, and I think it must go on until the nation which has been attacked can be safeguarded. No complaint can be made by an aggressor who has not purged his aggression. Considering that the forces of the aggressor are based on Manchuria, the U.N. forces have shown great restraint in not bombing there.
- (7) In view of the fact that the United Nations can be paralysed at any time by the veto, it was the right of every U.N. nation to come to the assistance of a nation attacked, and it was her moral duty to do so. In modern times, this has occurred in all great wars. In the case of the Italian attack on Abyssinia, I do not think the League of Nations was in a position to do more than it did do, but I certainly believe that it was the duty of the Great Powers to intervene to protect Abyssinia. If they had, the future course of history would have been very different.

June, 1953

I want now to examine the repercussions of the war, and in this enquiry I shall address myself to the following questions:—

Has its impact on the United Nations been good or bad?

What effect has it had on the relations of the nations who are most concerned with Asiatic questions?

What are its consequences on the strategic complex of the North-West Pacific?

Have the diplomatic and military reactions to this strategic situation been of such a character as to promote security?

The Impact On The United Nations

I think that it is clear that if the U.N. had not acted as it did its usefulness would have been just as surely ended as the usefulness of the League of Nations was ended when it failed to check Italy. It would be idle, however, to say that great problems and difficulties have not disclosed themselves. If every U.N. intervention is to be followed by a war as long and costly as the Korean war, and as devastating to the country to be saved, the United Nations will break down. This, of course, can be ascribed to the fact that some nations are not acting in support of U.N. objectives. I think that U.N. action, to be effective, must be clear-cut, short and decisive. For this purpose, there must be preliminary organisation, and this task was not accomplished in the early days of U.N. The support accorded to U.N. by the great majority of the members is gratifying, but the fact that the burden has fallen so completely on U.S.A. is a weakness. The obligation to contribute should be more widely recognised, and this contribution should be a matter of preliminary organisation. It is clear, however, that Russia has not dared to show herself as a participant—she has acted under cover of, and from, China and North Korea, and sacrificed their men and not her own.

The Impact On World Relations

It is very doubtful if the nations of Asia recognise the fact that the intervention in Korea has been on behalf of a small Asiatic people. If we had not intervened, I think an outcry would have been raised, and it would have been said that we would not risk a man or a pound to help an Asiatic Power, but India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia and Burma have actually displayed neutrality, and while Thailand and the Philippines have sent contingents, the attitude of the others has created the idea either (a) that this is a war fought against an Asiatic nation, or (b) that it is a phase of the cold war, from which Asiatic people hope to isolate themselves.

On my premises, it is, of course, not possible to deny that there is some truth in the latter idea, but the former is the view which I am told is widely held and condemned by Asian people. On the face of it, a number of Western Powers have soldiers in the field, fighting against Chinese and North Koreans. Russia's skill in concealing her part in it has been successful, and the Chinese propaganda of hate, coming from an Asiatic source, appeals to Asians. It is rather difficult to meet such propaganda in an illiterate continent. The tendency of Asians is, of course, determined by the fact that the Western nations concerned have been colonial Powers.

The fact that Powers like U.S.A. and Britain have retreated from their special position, and that they have been spending millions in aid to Asia, and are in a position to give scientific assistance on a large scale, does not seem to weigh with these people. I do not suggest that these fears are not genuine, or are not actual. That may be so, or may not. Asian peoples are so inarticulate and so unco-ordinated that it is difficult to make affirmations about them. It is easy to mobilise opinions. Hostile demonstrations can be organised with ease among people who hardly know what is meant.

I think it may be taken that the world's strongest Power will always be regarded with hostility by primitive or undeveloped people. Britain was, and U.S.A. now is, the greatest Power in the world, and because these nations are open and active, they are regarded as hostile, when Russia, which is not active, is not subject to criticism. I am afraid that we must accept the fact that, in an irrational world, it is impossible to avoid these misconceptions, and that we have to take what we consider the correct policy, and meet the difficulties which arise. It will be seen, however, that the attitude of Asian nations to the Korean war is part of the general problem of Asia, on which the democratic Powers have to formulate a policy, and that this is too big a question to be dealt with in this essay. I am devoting another essay to questions of this kind.

From this point of view, we should consider the impact of the war on Korea, China and Japan.

The Agent Of Imperial Russia

Korea. On the assumption we have made, North Korea has definitely made herself the agent of Imperial Russia, and, theoretically, cannot complain about the challenge being taken up by U.N. On the other hand, the effects of the war are being suffered by millions of peasants, who have probably never heard of U.N., and they will judge the conduct of the parties entirely on their own experience. They recognise that they cannot influence their own Government, and are encouraged to blame the anta-

June, 1953

gonists of that Government. If there is devastation in North Korea, the nations fighting for the cause of U.N. are blamed for it. I know that it is difficult to limit the scope of, or mitigate, the measures taken in war, and bombing must be indiscriminate, but there is a strong case for consideration in this matter. Methods of warfare should not make people irreconcilable or peace impossible. I have no doubt, also, that most South Koreans believe that the struggle going on is between Great Powers, who are using their soil for their own purposes, and that they have very little interest in it and resent their sufferings. The attitude of the South Koreans will also be affected by their relations with their own Government. Few of these Asian administrations are free from corruption, and none are really efficient, and though, so far as an outsider can see, they remain loyal to the U.N., they can hardly enjoy their experience. I could expand these considerations almost indefinitely, but they would almost all work towards the conclusion I have already expressed, namely, that U.N. action, if it is to secure the results expected, must be short, sharp and effective. The answer, of course, for this is that there must be far more complete preliminary organisation, which the disagreements of the major Powers made impossible, and also that intervention would, in any case, have been necessary, if the strategic situation in the North-West Pacific was to be made secure. In this event, the Koreans would regard themselves as unfortunate in being made the corpus vili.

These arguments work in various ways. Do the Koreans blame their own Government for landing them in the mess, and what is their attitude towards being protected by hordes of Chinese invading their soil and controlling the resistance? Of course, the natural instinct of the Asian is to blame the Westerners, as the Imperial or Colonial Powers, and this attitude is being carefully encouraged. But there has never been much love lost between China and Korea. China always regarded Korea as part of her Empire, and although China's suzerainty has been of a shadowy character for 150 years, China was almost always ready to reassert it. I have seen no evidence on the relations between the North Koreans and the Chinese, and it is no use discussing them here.

There is also no evidence on the question of the attitude of Korea to the Soviet, or of any resentment being expressed to the Soviet fighting the war with Korean lives. The stream of refugees at all opportunities from North Korea probably indicates a vague feeling of resentment, but it must be admitted that Russia has displayed much skill in concealing her part in the war from the rank and file of her victims. After all, it is fairly easy to convince a people like this that they are being attacked by Western Powers and are being helped by the Soviet, as long as the propaganda is ostensibly conducted by indigenous agents.

Chinese Accept Communist Story

China. As with the Koreans, all Chinese sources of information and propaganda are controlled by the Government, and I have no doubt that a large majority of the Chinese people accept the Communist story in its entirety. It was first put over by the Yen-an radio during General Marshall's term of office in 1946, and it has been continued ever since. This story tells of the wickedness of U.S.A. in helping the Korean Government against the Communists, the attack by the South Koreans against North Korea, with the connivance of U.S.A., the threat to Manchuria by the advance of U.N. forces to the Yalu River, and the army of volunteers spontaneously surging to their defence. As I have already said, it is almost established that the attack on South Korea was made with the connivance of China and on her promise to assist. I think it is probable that the Chinese Government was willing to do what the Soviet wanted it to do, but it is probably also true that the Chinese leaders were fanatical Communists, committed to extending the world revolution, and believed that they were doing their duty, and like all Communists, keenly alive to the desirability of finding excuses for their action, which will convince their people, and if possible, the world. They therefore moved their troops into position and took the advance to the Yalu by MacArthur as their excuse for invading Korea. The fact that the Chinese were reported early in October and that there were hundreds of thousands across in November indicates a mobilisation which must have taken months. The intransigence of China is shown in her response to the United Nations Cease Fire Committee of UNO in December, and in their persistence ever since, although it must have become clear that a settlement could easily have been got on fair terms. It is typical Communist fanaticism, a mood with which it is impossible to argue.

In my opinion, it is therefore fair to suggest that any alteration in U.S. policy in China, or failure to recognise the Chinese Government, or refusal to admit China to the U.N., or any alteration in the conduct of the war, would have made no difference whatsoever. We have to accept, I think, the Chinese Government as fanatical, determined to extend Communist power wherever it can, without any of the caution or the guile of their Russian mentors. It is a case of a pupil more enthusiastic and more simple than his master. I think it may be taken that China is committed to a strong Communist offensive, which is only limited by the scarcity of her material resources. I do not think there is a doubt that if the pressure is relieved in Korea they will take action in another place. I think they will go on until the regime is undermined by internal weaknesses, of which I see no sign, but which I think is likely in the

June, 1953

long run. Apart from this, it is quite possible that a wave of imperialist sentiment will affect the Chinese people. This may precipitate the material bankruptcy of the Chinese Government, but it makes China a danger, because Chinese people are always apt to ignore their weaknesses.

The Korean war may be said to have challenged the Chinese people and caused them to react strongly and effectively. The Communistic organisation has probably given the Chinese a sense of unity and power. The people no doubt believe that they are being attacked by the colonial Powers, and their armies have successfully resisted. China has entirely changed her position in East Asia. This is one of the repercussions of the Korean war.

The Prewar Policy Of Japan

Japan. The immediate effects of the Korean war on Japan can be considered apart from its long-term consequences on that country, but such separation is somewhat artificial. To sum up the real effects we would have to consider the prewar policy of Japan, and the long-term interests of that country. I have only room to deal with all these factors in a summary way. Most of the immediate effects have been favourable to Japan. She derives great economic benefits from the war. Her relations with the Western Powers have changed considerably. They are now eager to help her, though this feeling is not unmixed with suspicions of her imperialistic tendencies. Her restoration into the comity of nations, which she earnestly seeks, has been very much advanced. When peace was made with Japan the terms of the Treaty were much more favourable than she expected before.

On the other hand, she has been compelled to allow her soil to be used as a base for the Western allies to handle the Korean war, and this definitely brings her into the line of fire in the struggle between East and West. Her statesmen must have noticed, however, that if the Korean war goes against the Allies, her position will be immeasurably worsened. Japan will be practically surrounded in the north and west, and, although the Peace Treaty was favourable to her, she was practically compelled to allow U.S. bases in Japan, which will be manned by American troops, who claim extraterritorial privileges.

World War II was, of course, a great burden on the economic and social structure of Japan, and a good deal of the immense stability of its structure has been undermined, partly by the strain of the war, and partly by the attempts of the Americans to substitute democratic for the old feudal methods. Meanwhile, the war has greatly strengthened China as an international Power. She is no longer the weak and decadent state

she had been for 150 years, inviting attack from all sides. No Power is anxious to cross swords with China at the present time. Finally, the war has greatly increased the Japanese population, and she will be hard put to it to feed them or maintain their standards of living. The supply of food, raw materials and other basic necessities, will always be an anxious preoccupation for Japanese statesmen.

What we are aiming at in this section is to assess the effect of these factors on the Japanese mentality, and try to judge what effect they will have in determining Japanese policy. This is not a matter on which a foreigner can speak with any confidence, but the following considerations may help us.

Japan has always been intensely nationalistic and jealous of her independence, and she has always recognised the difficulties of her position, and has always been willing to take great risks to safeguard it. In fact, her foresight was somewhat remarkable. Her resistance to the reassertion of Chinese sovereignty over Korea which led to the Sino-Japanese war of 1895, and the attack on Russia in Manchuria in 1904 are instances of this foresight. The way in which she prepared her way first by the alliance with Britain was very impressive, but what the West finds it hard to forgive her for is that she always sought the solution through power, and never aimed at an equilibrium in Asia. She annexed Korea and Formosa, and subsequently occupied Manchuria. Her answer would be, of course, that, owing to the weakness of China, the factors necessary for a balance of power did not exist. China had no weight and was unable to resist attack or pressure from Russia, Japan or the Western Powers. Further, she might answer that the Western empires were built by force, and if they were now satiated and wanted to pursue peaceful means, their needs of expansion were never as great as hers.

Consideration Of Own Interests

Nobody who has studied Japanese diplomatic history could possibly affirm that the determinations of Japanese policy were due to anything else than a consideration of her own interests, and were never influenced by a desire to get a world equilibrium or establish the principles of a world order. Japanese statesmen simply would not admit that professions of this kind coming from other nations were sincere. I think Western nations have been somewhat unfair to Japan in not agreeing that Japan's need for outlets for markets or for expansion was great, and almost desperate. They were also unfair in being afraid of her competition, and failing to make concessions through which her needs could be supplied.

June, 1953

It is true, of course, that Japan had a population of thirty million in 1867, and if she had maintained that population in some stability, the evils due to overpopulation need not have occurred; but, whereas other nations had avenues for the redistribution of their population, Japan had none.

Another feature of Japanese policy is that she has never actually committed herself to any particular bloc of nations. In the case of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, she was negotiating both with Russia and Great Britain at the same time, and only came down to concluding the treaty with Great Britain at the last moment. Afterwards, she speedily started to make arrangements with Russia to preserve the disposition which followed the treaty of Portsmouth, and these arrangements continued until the outbreak of the Pacific war. During most of this time there was some sort of non-aggression pact with Russia. Japan had, indeed, a natural affinity with authoritarian Powers, and when these Powers proposed a redistribution of the world in 1940, Japan was willing to join.

Japanese relations with the democratic Powers have been less cordial. She resented racial exclusion and also the resistance to her obtaining the full results of her victory over Russia, the action taken at the Washington Conference of 1921-2, the strong criticism of her action against China in the thirties; and I have no doubt that she resents still more the damaging provisions of the Treaty of Yalta, in which the whole strategic position in the North-West Pacific was changed against her.

I think it may be said that the efficiency-(on her own plane) of Japanese policy was due to the structure of the community which she had adopted. There was no revolutionary destruction of the intensely feudal set-up, but the leadership of the new State was taken up, after the Renaissance, by the feudal lords, and they modernised the community, taking care, of course, to maintain their position of dominance. There was no premature adoption of democratic forms or methods. Decisions were made by a small number of political leaders in secret conclave. Whatever we may think of this, we cannot deny that Japan is the one Asiatic country which has made the successful transition from a mediaeval state to a strong modern industrial community.

It is true that this gave Japan many of the weaknesses of totalitarianism. The monolithic structure is never strong enough. It is not really monolithic. Its internal parts are bound together but not completely fused. It cannot therefore have the elasticity that is needed. It was always possible to see changes in Japanese policy from month to month, according as one or other group dominated. Ultimately this led them to disaster. Yet I do not think that the Japanese will feel themselves sure enough of

stability to commit themselves to the chances of democratic methods, and I am sure that General MacArthur has not been able to do it.

On the whole, I think it may be said that Japan will seek above all things to maintain her own national independence, and that a decision will be based on a careful assessment of the strategic factors involved. We shall attempt to make this examination in the next section. I think only one answer to the examination is possible, and that is that Japan is safer with the Western Powers, or in their bloc, but it is possible to influence the decision adversely, if we follow certain lines. On the other hand, Japan is capable of being misled, if she overvalues her position. She may believe that she can play one bloc off against the other, and go on bargaining until the situation becomes embarrassing to all.

Careful Western Policy Essential

In this view, it seems essential for the Western Powers to pursue a very careful policy; we should show our strength, but avoid offending national susceptibilities. No occupying Power is ever popular for long, and the assertion of extraterritorial rights is very galling to an Asiatic Power, especially to Japan, who had them abolished in the 1890's. Our treatment of war criminals is also a grievance which rankles. It has done more to harm relations than it will do to reform the criminals or change the mentality of the Japanese people. It is, of course, difficult to make adjustments of economic conditions and trade, while it would be difficult to modify immigration policy or grant Japan territorial expansion. I will discuss the question of policy after considering the next question, but generally, my view is that Japan is likely to accept the view that the Americans have a great interest in protecting them, and that they will do best by allowing her to do so by the forces and bases that have been set up, so long as U.S. does not, by her policy and the conduct of her forces, irritate the Japanese people. While this is so, she will only slowly re-arm.

One cannot ignore the fact that irrational trends may develop, or that internal strains may cause power to be held by determined groups, with a definite idea of what they want and how to get it. Democratic policy, with its atomisation of the individual, gives a peculiar advantage to the determined group. The majority is often dissipated, and the minority may be concentrated. In Japan there is an intense sense of the State, which leads, as a rule, to extravagant displays of loyalty to the party in power, whatever its origin and views. So far the feudal structure of Japan has prevented this from having any disruptive effect, or leading to dictatorship—the strong tradition leading to loyalty to the Emperor has

June, 1953

been a stabilising influence. On the other hand, a feudal form of government, like that of Japan, leads to sympathy with authoritarian government, and Japan has been at times willing to join the "dictators' trade-union".

Japan has been an oligarchy, subject to tradition, rather than a dictatorship, but she has found dictatorship preferable to democracy. Japan has not been averse to adjusting her policy to the Soviet, but that was because she felt herself in an unassailable position in the Far East. I would say, however, that there is as little chance of adjustment between the political systems of the Soviet and Japan, as between the Soviet and a Western democracy. Communism makes feudalism its chief enemy, and when it acquires control, roots out all the tradition and norms of the state it has conquered.

Japan is probably just as suspicious of American democracy as she is of Communism. I do not think she will willingly give up her feudal structure, because her intuition tells her it is her chief source of strength; and, as no European community has acquired a democratic government without passing through a feudal stage, I do not think we can quarrel with Japan if she goes through the same crisis.

We must not forget, also, that it was the democratic Powers which defeated Japan, dropped the atom bomb and hung the war criminals. No one can gainsay the success which has attended the appeasement policy of America. Few people have a better appreciation of the sociological bases of national life than the American student, and the Americans were fitted to do this. I was able to follow the trains of thought on the Japanese peace at Washington, and the chief feature of this was that two entirely antagonistic strains of thought were in conflict. One, the dominating militaristic attitude towards an enemy, and the other, the academic trend, full of Japan's history, well aware of her sociological feature, her traditions, political structure, and of the technique of peacemaking. These two trends would still have been in conflict, if the military minds had not made a wide survey and concluded that the strategic position was such that Japan must not be alienated. Nevertheless, it must be understood that, in the army and in Congress, there is a hard section, which cares nothing for the ideas and the prestige of others, and if this section determines policy, things may be done which will alienate the Japanese people. In this part I have tried to balance conflicting trends and no final conclusions have been possible. I would say that Japanese interests are best served by association with the Western Powers, but in an irrational world it is not always possible to rely on reason.

The United Nations, Colonialism And Australia

C. D. Rowley

THE Trust Territories of New Guinea and Nauru, and the Non-Self Governing Territory of Papua give a special bent to Australian policy in the United Nations, by almost automatically aligning the Commonwealth Government with those of the other colonial powers in the organization—a perpetual voting minority in the Assembly with which the United States has never completely identified herself. Thus, Australia's interests involve her not only in the exchanges of the Cold War, but also in the tensions heightened in the period of breaking up of the colonial system. Both issues justify speculation as to the essential *raison d'être* of that machinery—Security Council, General Assembly, and Trusteeship Council—which centralizes diplomacy and provides locus and administration for the perpetual international debate. This machinery it seems necessary to consider irrespective of intentions associated with its origin, and of the hopes that still rest on its activities.

Experience of three decades since the founding of the League of Nations, by emphasising the absence of other grounds for hope, has strengthened widespread compulsions towards naive faith in the efficacy of the United Nations—a faith that wilts as one approaches the shrine. It is seen by many both as motive force and stabilizing factor, a world government in embryo, or at least an experiment in that direction: a superstructure based upon national governments, which is the embodiment in practice of political theory and planning, and which may succeed and control the national states, or fail and disappear.

Such a view does not account satisfactorily for the marked *cohesion* of the organization and the trend towards universal representation of sovereign states.

Reports of Security Council, Assembly, or Trusteeship Council meetings undoubtedly exacerbate mass enmities within nations and within the supra-national "blocs" against the hostile stereotypes created by the propaganda systems, partly because of opportunities there provided for blatant and studied insult and defiant counter-statement. But it is at least suggestive that there is no resultant flying-apart of the organization into its national or bloc components. In fact the opportunities for public insult may actually serve, to some extent, for the continuous discharge of inter-

June, 1953

national tensions. Member Governments apparently consider their active representation essential: and one of the outstanding diplomatic errors since the 1939-45 war seems to have been the failure of the Soviet Union to maintain continuous representation in the Security Council. Such cohesion for conflict cannot be adequately explained by the forces of theoretical internationalism or humanitarianism, which have effectively influenced the direction of change *within* the national states of the West, but have had only limited effect on policy across national or cultural frontiers. Obviously enough, the cohesive forces are fear and self interest, forces always effective across the frontiers, and powerful in their impetus towards war.

Political Machinery Of U.N.

The political machinery of the United Nations, irrespective of its professed purposes, enables these forces and the tensions related to prestige and distrust, to find an outlet other than mechanized warfare. The anthropologists know the possibilities of war becoming stylised and conventional. In historical Western society deadlock in warfare often resulted in a truce, during which, by convention, parley replaced fighting in the effort towards a solution. If each side realises that war would destroy both, and each represents governments which acknowledge the minimum of responsibility for their people; and if claim and counter-claim are so completely irreconcilable that no compromise seems possible, such a state of parley might continue indefinitely. Technology has made us one of another, like Siamese twins where death is one and indivisible; so that fear may perpetuate arrangements for constant contact, with all facilities for the verbal expression of enmity and suspicious watchfulness. Such a balance of tension upon the brink of war may continue indefinitely without full-scale war, and the machinery continue to operate contemporaneously with war limited as to geography and weapons, so long as governments of the major powers are limited by the sense of responsibility for the welfare—or even the existence—of their citizens. So the United Nations machinery may serve to express and solidify deadlock between great powers and the total balance of power in the world.

The voting arrangements for the Security Council seem perfectly designed to balance animosities and frustrate action, reflecting the local diplomatic deadlocks of the "frontier" areas—Berlin, Vienna, Tokyo—and the military one at Punmunjon. For years now we have been growing accustomed to the process of which the first stage is the statement of irreconcilable claims, accusations, and proposals: next comes that of the special committee seeking formulas for compromise where there can be none. It would be wrong to assume that the search is useless, or that the

expensive series of committees, ambiguous recommendations and reports, and conference-series are not serving a real purpose. For delay can in itself be all important. Not only does the world win time, but so long as the process continues there is no complete loss of diplomatic contact. If such a loss does occur, there is left only the condition where armed force faces up to armed force—a situation in which war may be precipitated by military adventurers.

Peace-War Boundaries Blurred

It is in fact so important to all concerned to maintain diplomatic contact, both inside the United Nations and elsewhere, that the traditional boundaries between peace and war have been blurred. Membership has proved compatible progressively with several threats of war; with isolated acts of war such as the shooting down of aeroplanes, and finally with warfare on the Korean scale.

Once admitted to the United Nations, no middle or lesser power is likely to cut itself off from the general diplomatic exchange. But it could happen that a major power under the control of a political elite both prepared and able to disregard the welfare of its citizens, would be prepared as a matter of doctrine or from complete cynicism to deny all but military contact with its opponents. This would imply its withdrawal from the United Nations (with a consequent renunciation of important propaganda and prestige advantages) dragging satellite states in its train. Even then, I think, there would be further diplomatic approaches, particularly by governments regarding themselves as more or less neutral on the particular issues: and so many powers would be vitally interested in such approaches (which might even coexist with further deterioration towards a state of full-scale war) that there would result the embryo of another international organization for peace. In fact, the International Organization is primarily the expression of a condition of comparative non-war, and the architectonic labours of the political theorists have merely given form to processes that were inevitable in any case.

It may be possible that, by satisfying national prestige demands, "diplomatic" exchanges of the new type provide some substitute for physical combat, though any permanent substitution would be a wild hope indeed. Yet they may be regarded as a sort of catharsis rather than propaganda preparation for war, as the reports, highlighted by the propaganda systems, seem to satisfy, in part at least, the need for prestige at home without adding to the danger of full-scale war. Degrees of insult mean comparatively little when the ultimate defiance is given daily. So within the safe confines of the Trusteeship Council or the Assembly, a former

June, 1953

colony may twist the tail of the British lion, or the Australian David slang the Soviet Goliath.

This opportunity to express without immediate fear of reprisal by force or economic action inter-cultural and international enmities is in itself an incentive towards the overall cohesiveness of the United Nations, and the will of governments to achieve or to retain membership. No responsible government can afford indifference to the basic issues in debate. Major powers, tied to the organization, use the voting machinery of the Security Council to keep out new members whose admission will either alter the balance of voting unfavourably or amount to a concession of principle. One major power, Communist China, and several lesser ones, are thus denied what is tantamount to universal diplomatic recognition.

In League Of Nation Days

In the days of the League of Nations deep resentments across barriers of culture and colour tended to be masked at the level of diplomatic exchange, and more particularly in the League itself, by the "colonial" arrangements for political control of very large areas of the world, though in certain cases, such as the Mandate System, the problems giving rise to these resentments broke through. It was easier for those in the Western tradition to hold idealist views of the League, and see it through the benign spectacles of members of the Great Society. Through the defection and preoccupation of the United States, the lack or modification of sovereignty in non-European communities in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, with their comparative lag in espousing the cause of nationalism, and through the outlawry of the Soviet Union for most of the period, the League remained predominantly European, its deliberations carried on within the more or less courtly traditions of Western diplomacy on the assumptions of international law, until the illusion was shattered by the raucous shoutings of the European dictators. It was tempting, in the reaction against the excesses of 1914-18, to overlook the origin of the League as a confederation of victors in mechanized war; and to find grounds for hope, in the activities of Council, Assembly, and Court, that governments, through an assumed growth of democratic institutions, were reflecting the long-range self interest of their citizens. It was always clear enough that this attempt to centralize diplomatic exchange was a sign of increasing economic interdependence, and of the rapid development of communication—of ideas, persons, bombs or what you will; though major powers in the Council often aroused the ire of the lesser members of the Assembly and of the "collective security" groups at home by preferring the old type diplomacy *a deux*. Meanwhile the Western dynamo churned

out its technical achievements, heightening clashes of cultures, power systems, and political ideologies both round the limits of empires and behind the Imperial facades. The industrial revolution had already taken root where there were physical resources and more or less disciplined communities capable of exploiting them; and the export of machinery, expertise, the concepts of nationalism, and European materialist education had already stimulated the reaction of Asia and the colonial empires.

So the 1939-45 war not only made clearer the power supremacy of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., but also hastened the dissolution of colonial ties. This process of dissolution has provided the dynamics of the few years since 1945. The colonial powers themselves took the lead, at the end of the war, in setting up the United Nations machinery for supervision of Trust and Non-Self Governing Territories, and already they have been thrown on to the defensive in a political struggle second only to the Cold War, and potentially, in all its implications, at least as dangerous for peace.

Debates Reflecting Cold War

So far this issue has been overshadowed by the debates reflecting the Cold War, in which the votes of the majority, uneasily led by the United States, have hammered against the veto of the Soviet Union. Characteristic have been "postponement" of settlements where territorial boundaries or spheres of influence are at stake; and where matters of principle are at stake, the use of ambiguous phraseology to simulate agreement, so that the machinery may continue to operate. Middle and lesser powers concerned with safety and prestige, and motivated by a genuine idealism which it would be silly to deny, push in to influence policy and be consulted in what they regard as their proper spheres. And there has been the perpetual process of mediation by governments whose vital interests are not immediately concerned, or concerned in such a way that compromise is all-important. The idea has gained currency that "blocs" of lesser powers may form effective pressure groups for common purposes.

It is, then, within this sort of debate, and temporarily overshadowed by the power and ideological struggle between the communist and anti-communist governments, that the colonial issue has developed. Therefore it is not a simple separate issue: and has developed as one aspect of what up till now has been the main struggle.

Though the Security Council veto has operated to keep out many "new" governments, with Communist China as the most important, the dissolution of colonial ties has brought many into the United Nations. These have, for the most part, a common sense of recent injustice, a somewhat naive faith in social mechanics, a doctrinaire view of the world inherited by their leaders from the Western revolutionary tradition, and resentments

June, 1953

bred mainly in the clash of cultures, no doubt heightened in some cases by Western colour prejudice. Thus the real tensions of the world have been brought into the open forum of the United Nations: it is little wonder that the atmosphere differs somewhat from that which produced the finesse of polite diplomacy. Governments recently emerged in the Middle East and Asia have on the colonial issue an affinity with certain older states, particularly in the American continents, where an anti-colonial tradition has been fostered by the interpretation of national histories. The Moslem, Asian, and South American blocs, on the basis of one government one vote, have mounted a real offensive in relation to those areas of the world which are still subject to political control of the "colonial" type. This has been possible very largely through the complaisance of the United States which has its own tradition of opposition to "imperialism". And, of course, each particular issue provides opportunity for the doctrinal dissertations and abuse of the Soviet delegate.

May Develop Counter-attack

The government of colonial peoples is logically part of the wider question involving the rights of all groups under political control of governments in which they are not fully represented. Such a wider question may be, and has been, asked with respect to conditions within certain of the sovereign states which denounce "colonialism" as such. The "colonial" powers may yet develop such a counter-attack, for instance, through the Commission on Human Rights; a "tu quoque", though by no means a valid or even safe defence against charges involving specific abuses of rights or failure to observe the terms of the Charter or of the Trusteeship Agreements might justifiably be used to widen the issue and so put the colonial problem in truer perspective. It is interesting that South African internal racial policies have already been described as a threat to peace by a member of the anti-colonial bloc. This has created a precedent indeed for the colonial group; though issues cross over and fuse when the United States, hardly the champion of the colonial group, leads the attack on the position of human rights within the Soviet Union.

But having adopted the machinery of reports and supervision under the Charter, the colonial powers are immediately vulnerable, and the main tide of change and probably of world opinion is running against them. So any government, recently emerged from colonial status, irrespective of its own tribal or depressed minorities, may for prestige, for idealism, or on the basis of doctrinaire theory in the general crusade against the colonial system, come into attack. This sort of thing is interesting but hardly dangerous as yet: but it would be dangerous to assume that all such criticism is either ill-informed, or to be disregarded, in the long term,

with impunity. There is not yet an issue here threatening world war, but the tensions finding an outlet in this way do add appreciably to the general instability. So far there is little outward sign of similar tensions within areas under the control of communist governments. Their existence is for the time being both masked by monolithic political structures, and denied by doctrine: to be revealed to the world only through political collapse or military defeat of the Soviet Union. In the meantime Soviet diplomacy has succeeded in having its bona fides on this issue accepted by most of the newer governments which vote against the colonial powers. This makes it easy to use the division on this issue within the non-communist world to lessen the possibility of united resistance in the Cold War. At first sight the Soviet Union line in the Trusteeship Council seems less skilful, as voting very often leaves her in a minority of one: but this is because the United States tends to tip the balance of voting against the colonial powers, so that the Soviet Union can afford not only to indulge in dialectics, but remain consistently in extreme opposition to colonialism.

If these things are so—for one writes with full realisation of the dangers of contemporary interpretation—what is the role and the potential on the world scale of the very widespread desire for peace, and the humanitarian sentiment which is still so strong, even if in a condition of ambivalence with strong national sentiment, and with cultural and colour prejudices? At the least, it provides the decorum and decency for the written contracts of association in the United Nations itself. It finds expression in many wise and humane activities of the Specialised Agencies, tackling social problems at the root of war in both the theoretical and practical spheres, though inevitably limited in practice by the failure of the political institutions to produce agreements and solutions. J. S. Furnivall¹ has noted the tendency by members of international bodies to vote in accordance with moral principle where they have no direct economic or other interest: at least this, also, we can fairly concede, though it may be lessened by the tendency towards voting in blocs, so that bargaining cuts down the number of governments willing to consider particular issues on their merits.

Common Moral Principles

It would be foolish to deny the potential influence in human affairs of the fact that member governments have acknowledged and formulated common moral principles. The very terms of condemnation or praise, the stuff of accusations, depend on values long accepted in the societies of Christendom and in Western law (how far basic in all human societies

1. J. S. Furnivall—*Colonial Policy and Practice*—page 534 et seq.

June, 1953

is a wider question): no member government denies explicitly the "principles of humanity" explicit and implicit in the Charter, which assumes individual welfare as the proper end of government policy, thus perhaps stressing its origin in the reaction against philosophies denying the worth and dignity of the private citizen. And there is, at least, in the Declaration of Human Rights a statement, uniform if not always precise, of those conditions which all member governments have agreed to be essential for the proper dignity and development of man in society: so that even in a world that appears doomed to a long and violent period of struggle for power, there exists, in almost every written language, a kind of Magna Carta—perhaps to provide impetus to revolution—or conservation—in some unforeseeable future.

But, as influences in international politics, sentiments for humanity and peace are dissipated where the will to power moves from one precise objective to another, and good intentions may be stalemated in sterile conflict. There is, in fact, no definite ground for hope based on increased effectiveness of humanitarian sentiments.

What, then, is a reasonable attitude for us, as members of the Australian Commonwealth, to adopt towards the United Nations? First, we can make up our minds that in our lifetime such an organization is inevitable in a world not involved in major war: and that for the purposes of national policy, as well as for those of international goodwill, the Commonwealth must retain membership. At the same time let us beware of identifying majority resolutions with the truth, or with the cause of peace—so easy on issues like the Cold War where we vote with the majority, and not so easy on the colonial issue where we are in the minority.

As for Commonwealth policy, Governments since the war have had little choice in matters concerned with the Cold War: they do what they must. Membership, and support of the anti-Soviet line, are essential; the only possible scope for variation on this issue has been in the extent of support offered to United States policy in the Pacific.

But in her colonial policy Australia must, because of the special nature of the New Guinea problem, and that of the machinery of international supervision, face the world alone. Questions related to New Guinea also form part of the wider problem on which Australia must develop policy to meet her particular needs—that of her relations with the governments of South-East Asia. Those governments with which it appears imperative for us to establish permanent friendly relations see New Guinea as our shop window: in the United Nations, and on this issue, they vote against us. Thus matters which still tend to be regarded within Australia as domestic issues have become vitally important in Australian foreign policy.

Criticism And Attacks

We have had the criticism of the anti-colonial world—not so much yet for things done or left undone as because the political control is “colonial” in type. The more doctrinaire fulminations of the Soviet Union and satellites have in general little relation to reality within the Territory, though some Soviet criticism has been acute on some issues. Other governments which vote with us against the Soviet Union, have attacked on the general ground that colonial ties are not only unnecessary and undesirable relics of a discredited system, but that their abandonment within a measurable or even short period is necessary for realisation of human rights in the colonial areas. (This sort of theory has placed the Italian Government in the unenviable position of preparing Somaliland for independent nationhood within a span of ten years.) But the anti-colonial members of the Trusteeship Council—sometimes led by the United States—have also concentrated over some years on particular matters of administration within the Territory. The Commonwealth Government, in fairness to all concerned, could hardly go further than give genuine consideration to all recommendations from the United Nations, deciding each issue on its merits. The position not only calls for a very efficient administration, but the utmost care in carrying out specific international commitments. Of quite basic importance are all questions involving human rights there.

At the same time we have to avoid being manoeuvred into announcements of unrealistically optimistic programmes of development. The present trends of world opinion, with the social and political crises in the tropical areas of the world becoming more evident, tend to push governments with colonial responsibilities into declarations and assurances which represent hopes rather than realities. In self-defence against attacks of the ill-informed, generalising from the anti-colonial interpretations of their own histories, we may be tempted to offer guarantees not only that everything possible is being done to bring this “backward area” into the modern world, but that the process is well on the way: that all will be well in the end. But Australia cannot afford such temporary diplomatic shifts. We must be prepared to say clearly in the United Nations not only what the handicaps in New Guinea are, but what are the likely limits of administrative and educational achievement in any foreseeable future. Otherwise our position becomes in the long run diplomatically indefensible because it rests upon dreams rather than facts. There would also be the danger of a widening gulf between professed policy, based in the dream future, and administrative practice, which is tied to present facts. Such a gulf is a potent stimulus of the classic “colonial” troubles.

June, 1953

NOTES


The Dutch New Guinea Border

J. Reynolds

INDONESIAN claims to Dutch New Guinea and recent reports of the infiltration of Indonesian troops into Dutch territory have focussed attention on the proximity of Australian territorial possessions and the possible repercussions if Indonesian claims materialise. The questions have been raised of the position of the border between the Dutch and Australian territories, the extent to which the border acts as a natural boundary between culturally different peoples and the effectiveness of the border as a defence barrier in the event of some foreign Power whose attitude is unsympathetic towards Australian interests taking possession of the Dutch territory.

The history of the delimiting of the Dutch border between Dutch New Guinea and the Territory of Papua and New Guinea began in 1828 when a Dutch expedition left Batavia with instructions to take possession of that part of the island of New Guinea lying west of the one hundred and forty degree east meridian. The expedition accomplished its task, but extended the Dutch claims to cover all of the island west of the one hundred and forty-one degree east meridian.

When the Germans took possession of north-east New Guinea a treaty was concluded with the Dutch in 1885-1886 establishing the one hundred and forty-first meridian as the boundary between their respective territories. At first the British, who were in possession of the south-eastern portion of the island, also agreed on this meridian as the border between their territory and that of the Dutch, but in 1893 a combined party of British and Dutch officers were assembled in an attempt to determine a more workable and natural boundary; the one hundred and forty-first meridian being considered too artificial. This party recommended that the two Governments concerned adopt the mouth of the Bensbach River, located at $141^{\circ} 1' 48''$ East longitude and $9^{\circ} 7' 35''$ South latitude as the boundary on the south coast. From this point the proposed boundary should proceed north along the same line of longitude to a point where the line meets the Fly River, thence along the waterway of the Fly River to the 141° East meridian, thence along this meridian to the point of intersection of the British, Dutch and German boundaries at 5° South latitude. The



advantages of this proposal were considered to be that the boundary would be well defined at the coast, and unnecessary complications would be avoided by including all of the Fly River in British territory. In this way the British and Dutch would exchange about 280 square miles of territory. These recommendations became effective in 1896. Although British New Guinea has become an Australian possession, and German New Guinea has become an Australian Trust Territory, no alteration in the Dutch New Guinea boundary has occurred, and it remains as delimited by the agreements of 1885-1886 and 1896.

Despite the time which has elapsed since the original delimiting of the boundary, no complete instrumental survey of it has been made. In 1910 a German-Dutch boundary commission traversed portion of the one hundred and forty-first meridian from the north coast to the Sepik River. By arrangement between the Commonwealth of Australia and the Netherlands Government a survey party was supposed to have agreed on the determination of the one hundred and forty-first meridian at a point on the north New Guinea coast in 1933, but a patrol officer investigating native disputes in the north-eastern New Guinea border area in 1948 reported that two positions, one Dutch and one Australian, are marked, each claiming to be the 141st meridian. The Dutch obelisk is 100 metres north-west of the Australian stone. There are no records of any actual Governmental survey of the south-eastern portion of the border, although petroleum companies working in this area have undoubtedly fixed the boundary with some accuracy. Thus at present

June, 1953

the border exists as a well-defined line on maps or a concise statement of words in reports, but on the ground its position is still uncertain.

A study of the topography of New Guinea shows that the major topographic features of the island have an east-west trend. The boundary line runs, for its greater length, in a north-south direction thus cutting across the main topographic pattern and apart from two instances, namely the position of the southern end of the boundary at the mouth of Bensbach River, and the small section where the boundary skirts the Fly River, topographic features are completely ignored by the boundary and in no way help in fixing its position.

Since the boundary is not a natural one, there is no sharp demarkation between the areas it divides either in the nature of the terrain or in the inhabitants. Any Government claiming the right to the territory on one side of the border can quite logically claim the right to territory on the other side, using as a basis for its claims the similar cultures and racial bonds of the indigines.

The lack of any well-defined topographical features to mark the boundary make it ineffectual as a defence barrier. Fortunately the boundary area is extremely rough and inhospitable terrain. Coastal and lowland swamps and rugged, mountainous inland topography, although preventing adequate patrolling of the border, also mitigate against penetration across the border from the adjacent territory. For hostile troops to invade Australian New Guinea, say in the interior mountain regions, it would first be necessary for them to penetrate similar country on their own side of the border. Supply lines and communications would be extremely difficult to form and maintain. The areas which favour penetration, namely the coastal areas, are also those areas which could be most easily defended. However, if penetration was successful the nature of the country would make it extremely difficult to dislodge the invader.

To summarise, the border between Dutch New Guinea and the Australian-controlled Territory of Papua and New Guinea is merely an arbitrary division of the island. The division is well delimited on treatises and on maps. The actual boundary on the ground is by no means well defined either by survey or by topographic features. The artificiality of the boundary makes it ineffectual as a defence barrier, and renders it useless as a regional division based on cultural and racial distinctions.

Treaties Of Friendship, Commerce And Navigation

Dr. J. Leyser

TREATIES between nations on commercial matters belong to that part of International Law which has withstood the gruelling test of political upheavals more successfully than any other part. Britain's treaty with Portugal, embodying terms of alliance as well as commerce, dates from 1373, and is still in force. Among purely commercial treaties still valid today several date back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Others have been revised, or replaced by new treaties. The term "Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" became current in the nineteenth century, when countries wished to cover by treaty not only purely commercial and shipping matters, but also the rights of their nationals with regard to residence and business activity in the territory of other states. These comprehensive commercial treaties are distinguished in international law from more limited purely commercial treaties, such as trade agreements, which generally deal only with trade transactions, often merely a certain line of trade.

There is no fixed rule, or even general practice, regarding the duration of Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation¹.

Some of these have no time limit, others are terminable at any time, or after notice, or subject to revision upon notice. Since the beginning of this century, it has been general British practice to stipulate in commercial treaties for an express right of denunciation². The most recent British commercial treaty, with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, has a duration of fifteen years, with a proviso that it will continue in force thereafter from year to year, unless a year's notice is given. A recent United States treaty, with Italy, has a duration of ten years, with a similar proviso for continuation from year to year.

Considering the variety of commercial interests to be covered by treaty, it is understandable that there is no hard and fast design for the contents of commercial treaties. However, as an American writer on the law of commercial treaties put it, "some basic provisions have come to be so regularly inserted in treaties of this kind that their absence from the term of a particular bilateral treaty might be cause for surprise"³.

One of the main questions to be determined by such a treaty is

1. Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation will be referred to hereafter, for the sake of brevity, as Commercial Treaties.
2. See, with regard to British treaty practice, Sir Arnold McNair, "The Law of Treaties", Ch. XXXIII.
3. Robert R. Wilson, in "Postwar Commercial Treaties of the United States", "American Journal of International Law", 1949, p. 262.

the standard of treatment the national of one contracting party is to enjoy in the territory of the other. International law distinguishes four such standards:—so-called international law treatment (i.e. treatment in accordance with “ordinary standards of civilisation”); national treatment; most-favoured nation treatment; and finally, treatment according to special determination. Both British and United States treaty practice has tended to give extensive application to the principle of national treatment, and in cases where this standard cannot be applied, to apply the most-favoured nation standard. This means that nationals of one of the contracting countries (“A”) are to be treated in the other contracting country (“B”) either on the same footing as nationals of country “B” (“national treatment”), or on the same footing as nationals of *that* country (“C”) which by agreement or custom enjoys the most favourable treatment by country “B” (“most-favoured nation treatment”).

British and United States treaty practice varies with regard to the regulation of consular matters. Recent British commercial treaties (e.g. with Muscat and Oman, 1952) contain provisions on consular matters. On the other hand, United States practice since World War II has been to have consular matters regulated by special agreement. Another topic, which is of particular importance in case of a United States-Australian treaty—double taxation—is not dealt with in any of the recent United States treaties, thus leaving it for treatment by separate agreement.

Taking recent United States commercial treaties with European countries (Italy, 1948; Eire, 1951) as illustrative of provisions covered by such treaties at present, the following points are of particular interest:—

Rights of Nationals. These provisions, often referred to as “establishment provisions”, deal with the right of nationals of one country to enter, reside and travel in the territory of the other contracting party, to engage there in commercial, business, educational and professional activity, “in conformity with the applicable laws and regulations” (lawyers, by the way, excluded), and the right there to acquire and own real property⁴. An important extension of this right accorded to nationals is contained in the provision (Art. II of U.S.-Italian treaty) entitling corporations and associations including partnerships created in one country, to recognition and activity in the other country. This is a clear improvement over the unclear and unsatisfactory position of foreign companies under earlier commercial treaties.

There are detailed provisions in the treaty ensuring non-discriminatory

4. As in the U.S. legislation regarding real property is a State, and not a Federal matter, a special proviso making the rights of nationals of the other contracting party dependent on laws in force in the State concerned and its effect on Italian reciprocity was necessary (Art. VII U.S.-Italian treaty). In case of a U.S.-Australian treaty, the constitutional position regarding power to legislate on real property would be the same in both countries.

treatment of the foreign national (individual or company) with regard to access to court, criminal proceedings, and seizures and searches. A novelty is the reciprocal grant of social service benefits, such as old-age pensions and unemployment and sickness benefits, and also workmen's compensation payments. (Art. XII of U.S.-Italian treaty.) Equality of treatment in regard to taxation (Art. IX) is subject to a special reservation enabling each party to grant special concessions on the basis of reciprocity to other countries.

With regard to military service, the general rule is to exempt nationals of the other contracting party from compulsory service or training in the armed forces, and also from all contributions imposed in lieu thereof. However, special rules apply in case both countries are engaged in hostilities or are enforcing jointly measures for maintenance of international peace and security (Art. XIII, Sec. 2): in such a case, the general rule does not apply. That means the foreign national may be called up. Yet, instead of serving in the armed forces of the other country, he may elect to enter his own country's armed forces, unless he has already declared his intention to acquire the nationality of his host country.

Commerce and Navigation. The general principle here is that of "freedom of commerce and navigation" between the territories of the countries in question. Detailed provisions cover the application of this principle, and its limitations and exceptions, with regard to customs regulations, to transit of persons and goods, to the treatment of commercial travellers, and to shipping. The rule of non-discriminatory treatment applies in particular to the sale, distribution or use of articles imported from the territory of one party into that of the other, and of articles grown, produced or manufactured by nationals of one party in the territory of the other party. In line with a well-established rule of customary International Law, a special clause provides that the principle of freedom of navigation is not to apply to "coasting trade"⁵. Following recent trends in International Law, and in line with Continental practice, there is a provision effectively restricting claims to immunity by state-owned and state-controlled enterprises engaged in commercial, manufacturing, shipping or other business. (Art. XXIV Sec. 6 U.S.-Italian treaty.) Special provisions deal with state trading, financial transactions, and exchange control.

The United States treaties also contain an arbitration clause, referring any dispute on the interpretation or application of the treaty which has not been adjusted satisfactorily in the diplomatic way, to arbitration by the International Court of Justice.

An important "exception" provision in the United States commercial

5. This would include interstate, as well as intrastate, shipping.

June, 1953

treaty with Eire deals with preferential treatment for imports into Eire from British Commonwealth countries. The exemption of British Commonwealth imports from the operation of the general treaty provisions will be of even greater importance for an Australian commercial treaty with the United States.

Australia And The United Nations

N. D. Harper

THE Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is sponsoring a project for the study of National Attitudes to the United Nations. It is anxious to ascertain "significant trends of national action and attitudes concerning international organization and particularly the United Nations during the last decade". It is hoped that such study would increase the interchange of ideas on international organization and promote a better understanding of national policies by making clear significant differences of outlook and the main areas of agreement. It is clear that member states of the United Nations do not fully understand the possibilities offered by existing international organizations, and so the best use is not made of existing machinery.

The study will be concerned with an analysis of official policies towards the United Nations, its specialised agencies and other international organizations. It is intended to examine the reaction of informed opinion to such policies, and to study the attitude of significant groups representing wide sections of public opinion—churches, labour, industry, returned servicemen, etc. The central point of the investigation, however, will be the examination of "national policy objectives and their pursuit through the United Nations and related agencies". From this will emerge a picture, national in character, of the value and shortcomings of U.N. and its agencies, and recommendations will be made for the amendment of the Charter in 1955. It is hoped that it will be possible to publish the separate studies as monographs and that a special volume will draw together the conclusions of the whole project when it is completed in April, 1954.

The following countries have so far agreed to participate: Belgium, Canada, Chile, Egypt, France, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, Sweden, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yugoslavia. Switzerland is carrying out a separate but related study, and the Brookings Institution is appraising the attitudes and policies of the United States. The Australian Institute of International Affairs has accepted the invitation of President Joseph Johnson of the Carnegie Endowment to study Australian policies and attitudes. At its February meeting, the Commonwealth Council appointed Mr. N. D. Harper, Senior Lecturer in History at the University

of Melbourne, as Director of the Australian project, with Mr. David Sissons, Department of Political Science in the University of Melbourne as Research Worker to carry out the necessary research and to prepare the draft report.

The Australian project will be concerned in the first instance with an historical appraisal of Australia's participation in the United Nations. What part did devotion to principles of collective security and the cause of international co-operation play in the formulation and execution of Australian foreign policy? To what extent did it influence Australian governments, political parties, public opinion and pressure groups? This will necessitate the extensive examination at the outset of trends in Australian attitudes and policies towards international co-operation up to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the ratification of the Charter after the United Nations Conference.

The second part of the study will be concerned with a critical and extensive examination of the major problems of Australian foreign relations which *prima facie* appear to be within the ambit of the Charter, irrespective of whether the policy adopted or proposed was in accordance with or at variance with United Nations' principles. It will necessitate a study, for example, of Australian attitudes to Pacific security and the A.N.Z.U.S., and the proposed ANZAM, pacts; to the administration of backward peoples and the relationship of Papua-New Guinea to the Trusteeship Council; to the Colombo Plan and its connection with E.C.A.F.E.; to problems of domestic jurisdiction and of full employment. It will also require a study of Australia's relations with the Empire. The concluding part of the project will necessitate an analysis of proposals for Charter revision in the light of Australian experience in the pursuit of national objectives through United Nations and the limitations which United Nations as at present constituted imposes upon the achievement of such objectives. What structural changes would promote these in an international community?

To carry out the Carnegie project, each Branch of the Australian Institute is setting up a broadly based study group to discuss these problems and the drafts of each part as they appear. The final draft will also be circulated to Branches late in the year before being sent overseas. During the next six months the Research Worker, and on occasion, the Director, will visit each of the Branches to meet with and discuss the drafts with the study groups. In addition an attempt will be made to assess the attitudes of representative groups of a national character in each of the states. In this way, it should prove possible to obtain a national rather than a merely regional picture for Australia. The Director would welcome the fullest and most active co-operation of the Branches in the successful carrying through of the project.

June, 1953

The South Pacific Commission Conference*

AN IMPRESSION

R. Neal

I EXPECTED that I wouldn't have any deep impression of the Conference until the initial shyness had gone from the delegates and they had settled into the daily routine. But oddly enough I gathered my first two impressions on the first day!—and I cannot do better than quote from a recording I made for Radio Australia—"The island peoples want to be advised and led. Many of us have the 'let the Government do it' attitude, but this is not so among the island people. Rather 'give us the tools and we'll finish the job' is their attitude", and, "The delegates, both men and women, include a royal prince, several paramount chiefs, a chieftainess, doctors, teachers, members of councils, clerks and civil servants . . . all varied in culture and general background, but there seemed to be two desires common to all. The first is an intense longing to help themselves and the second is a desire to help each other".

Don't think that the delegates weren't shy and reserved at first—because they were, and the first couple of days were rather heavy going—but these desires were stronger than their shyness. Many of the papers read at the Conference asked for help, and many of the speakers sought to help each other.

Then I was impressed by the good quality and high standard of the papers which were presented. It was obvious that some of these had been written by officials of the several administrations—"officialese"—always offends the ear of a Talks Officer, and a Talks Officer can always tell when a person is not really "at home" with his script! But the papers which *were* obviously written by the delegates with *help* from the officials were to the point, and wasted no words. The debating, too, was of a high standard (many of the "more advanced" races could learn from these delegates). Whether the subjects were birth control or government duties on local industries (both "touchy" subjects) there was *never* any descent into abuse or personalities. Delegates would differ strongly but always courteously.

Then, too, there was a definite spiritual approach to most of the problems facing the islanders. It has been the fashion amongst some novelists, many traders and not a few Christian Australians, to decry the work of mission-

* Editor's Note: An article dealing at length with the Second South Pacific Commission Conference by Mrs. Nancy Robson will appear in the next issue of the "Outlook".

aries. Certainly, the history of missions is not all "sweetness and light", but they have left a definite mark on the culture of the peoples.

Let us not be too high and mighty as we prepare to help the "backward races". They are fully aware of all our faults and shortcomings, but they also take pride in our achievements. It has been the fashion in their post-war years to decry British imperialism. My British pride was well to the fore when a delegate from American Samoa proposed that a message of congratulations be sent to the Queen on her Coronation—and he paid tribute to the help given by the British to the peoples under their care! Yet these same people are aware of the contribution they can make to the common pool—as the same Samoan delegate said:—"I think we hear a lot about the contribution which the Europeans have to make for us, and we are very thankful for it—but I have some words to say about the contribution *we* have to make to the world. Do not underestimate it—the contribution which we have to make to the world. Do not underestimate it. By our manners and our outlook on life, by our philosophy of what is a good life, we have achieved a fame and an importance greater than our material contributions could ever give us. I do not think we can compete with other big countries in making cars or guns or planes or bombs, but we can give the world back something everyone else has lost: we can show how to live in love and harmony. We must, and we will, make economic advance to meet the world on equal terms, but we must never forsake our culture and our heritage."

The island peoples have many problems—many of their crops are infected with pests, they have problems of soil erosion and marketing, and many have growing populations, which are absorbing all their resources. They want to learn modern methods to deal with these problems and they want all that our educational experts can give them. No longer can we teach them simple arithmetic and reading—they want to reach the same standards as we have. They want their own people to be their engineers, doctors, lawyers, legislators and schoolteachers—they already have native priests and ministers. They are putting their trust in us—and "us" for the time being, is the South Pacific Commission.

It is doing an amazing work on less than £200,000 a year—provided by the six member Governments (by the way, how much does Australia's share cost each one of us?).

The native peoples are putting all their trust in the South Pacific Commission which is "us", and here is my final impression—if we let the South Pacific Commission down—it will be many, many years (if ever) before these people will look to us again.

June, 1953

BOOK REVIEWS

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE BRITISH LABOUR GOVERNMENT 1945-1951, by M. A. Fitzsimmons. University of Notre Dame Press, 1953.

OF recent years American scholars have shown an increasing interest in British institutions. Trades Unions, party systems, social services, local as well as central government, and many other aspects of British life have come under their intellectual survey. In part, this activity is doubtless due to the widening opportunities, particularly since World War II, which have been made available to Americans for overseas study. In part it is also no less due to the new status of the U.S.A. in world affairs. If the myths and legends which the Americans entertain about the British people are to be dispelled, and a firm basis for understanding is to be established then a close examination of British social forms and thinking is essential. For the British people such investigations are indeed welcome. They can at least have the opportunity of seeing themselves as others see them.

In line with this trend is the publication of Mr. M. A. Fitzsimmons. It is one of a series of international studies being undertaken by the Committee of International Relations of the University of Notre Dame, where Mr. Fitzsimmons is a teacher of history. Written in an easy style the book should be of interest to students of international affairs.

The intention of the author is clearly stated in the preface and he modestly limits himself to "a lighting up of the major lines and development of British foreign policy while the Labour Government held office". The plan of the book can be simply stated. It is a chronicle divided into four parts. The first (Chap. I, 29 pp.) attempts to establish the continuity of principle underlying British foreign policy from Palmerston to Bevin. The second (Chaps. II, 24 pp., and III, 31 pp.) concerns itself with the immediate postwar difficulties in Europe and Asia. The third part carries the story from the Marshall offer in 1947 to 1949 (Chap. IV, 20 pp.). The last part covers the last two years, in which the various crises inside Europe and Asia are considered. This is dealt with in two chapters.

The thesis seems to be clear enough. The foreign policy of the British Labour Government rested on established tradition drawing its motive power from Palmerston precept. Attacked from within by some of its own supporters for failing to create a socialist foreign policy, experiencing new and forceful pressures from without, the Labour Government exhibited a remarkable lack of adroitness in foreign affairs and failed to maintain "British Interests".

Space forbids an attempt to do more than indicate the direction of the argument supporting this view. For about a century before 1939, the foreign policy of Britain was motivated by the need to maintain a "balance of power". The only deviation during this period was the line taken by Mr. Neville Chamberlain. World War II created an uneasy coalition between Britain, U.S.S.R., and the U.S.A. Suspicions were aroused and solutions to many problems were postponed. Nevertheless, some form of compromise was reached at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. The Labour Government elected in 1945 did not create any new policy, socialist or otherwise. Instead she was committed to one, the foundations of which had earlier been laid by Sir Winston Churchill. The immediate postwar period brought to light difficulties of peacemaking in Europe and the weakness of Britain prevented her from taking an independent line. This weakness also showed itself in the East where the inept handling of affairs in Indonesia and Thailand aroused opposition and the end of empire followed in India, Burma, and Ceylon. The Middle East policy was a fiasco in which Britain was continually on the defensive. The crucial point in this process of difficulty, failure, and reduction of commitment was the Marshall offer. Yet after the initial disagreement between Bevin and Molotov, and the proposal for European co-operation suggested by the former, Britain steadfastly refused to participate completely in European Union, claiming that she was in a

special position because of her Commonwealth commitments. Devaluation, the insistence upon imperial preference, the continued refusal to accept an overall European Union and the insistence upon a "functional" approach to the problems of Europe, impelled Britain from one critical position in her foreign relations to another. In the Far East the only gleam of light in an otherwise darkened horizon was the Colombo Plan, but that was in no way substantial. The nationalism of the Asiatic countries was only favoured by Britain "for lack of anything else". Korea presented a further challenge. Although in the initial stages agreeing with the general line taken, it was not long before differences of opinion as to ends and means emerged between Britain and the United States.

In the last year of office, "humiliation and defeat pursued the Labour Government to the day of polling". The British attitude on China, especially after the latter's entry into the Korean war, tended to throw still more into relief the differences between U.S.A. and Britain. In Europe the controversy over the Atlantic Command; the persistent refusal to provide forces for a European Army; the strains of rearmament, made the pursuit of her policy still more difficult, while in the Pacific her role was that of a dependent rather than that of an initiator. Once again, the Middle East "exploded". The failure to understand Mossadek and the inability to come to an agreement with Iran and Egypt aggravated the position in which Britain found herself. At this point the Labour Government was defeated at the polls and Sir Winston took over.

A meagre summary such as this, unaccompanied, as it is in the book, by the significant detail, apt quotation and telling statistic, necessarily conveys an inadequate impression of the work. As an attempt to examine in short compass a world canvas which emerged in what was perhaps one of the more revolutionary phases in world history, Mr. Fitzsimmons' book must be commended. Yet it would be doing the author an injustice if at the same time it were not pointed out that the picture which emerges appears in some parts to be so over-simplified as to give a false impression. To suggest that the independence of India was in part due to the irresistible demand which grew to immense proportions during wartime is perhaps valid. To assert that divisive tactics on the part of British imperialism helped create an irresponsible temper among some Indians may also not be without warrant. But to impute to Mr. Attlee's decision, that Britain should leave India, a weakness rather than strength is to misjudge both Mr. Attlee and the Indian leaders. No one knows better than the Indian leaders how for many years Mr. Attlee supported and vigorously advocated Indian independence. Nor has Mr. Attlee been alone in this. In 1933, the Rev. Sorensen urged on the Labour Party Conference to reaffirm "the policy of self-determination and self-government for India accepted at previous party conferences", and this was overwhelmingly endorsed. This at the time of the Meerut prisoners. During the debates on India in the mid-thirties, the late Lord Wedgwood and a number of other Labour leaders attacked the Government for failing to do less than justice to India by conceding independence. Indeed Mr. Attlee's decision was the culmination of a promise given long ago by British Labour. This is not to suggest that Indian independence was the result of Labour action alone but that it was a complex in which pressures inside India and inside Britain itself were but two strands in the pattern. That independence coincided in time with a phase when Britain was prostrate from warfare is no doubt true.

That this should be interpreted as a sign of weakness is therefore understandable but such a view would fail to account for many aspects of the Indian scene. The voluntary assumption by India and Pakistan of Dominion status would be incongruous. Nor could it explain the warm regard which many of the Indian leaders have for the leaders of British Labour and in particular for Mr. Attlee himself, whose ovation during his recent journey to India was unique in British political history. Still less could it account for the more than 6,000 Indian students now being trained in Britain to take up posts in the Indian Civil Service. The facts collated by Mr. Fitzsimmons rest on shifting foundations and the author gives little indication that he is aware of any movement at all.

Nor would the impression be a valid one if it were held that the Indonesian

June, 1953

nationalists put up quotations from the Declaration of Independence and Lincoln's addresses because they were expecting the Americans (p. 60). The interpretation which was placed upon these slogans by those of us who were there was not that the "Yanks are coming" or that it was hoped that they would come but that the powerful liberal influences released at Philadelphia and Gettysburg had found another resting place in another colonial revolution. The nationalist movement inside Indonesia did not begin with the Japanese invasion. It had its roots in a past in which Indonesian students went to Europe, learned what an explosive power the Liberal Idea can be and went back and taught it to their people.

Perhaps still more questionable is the view that if Britain were not a debtor to Egypt and could have provided her with financial aid for internal development then Britain could have maintained a controlling influence on Egypt and the Arab League (p. 173).

These criticisms, however, are matters of interpretation only and Mr. Fitzsimmons is entitled to prefer those which he has placed on the factual relationships discerned by him. What is perhaps of more importance is the failure to utilise much of the evidence provided by the statements of principle made by Labour leaders and those provided in the Labour Party's publications. That this would have tended to modify some of the expressions of opinion and conclusions, Mr. Fitzsimmons tacitly admits in a footnote discussing Professor Elaine Windrich's book "British Labour's Foreign Policy" which relied mainly on "official" Labour sources. This book appeared after Mr. Fitzsimmons' work had gone to press and could not therefore have been utilised by him. But the data was available in abundance and Mr. Fitzsimmons could have taken it into account. The claim which Mr. Fitzsimmons makes, that he was pursuing a concrete approach, is significant but ideas give meaning to facts. To exclude them is to diminish the value of the concrete approach.

This omission is in part due to the historical assumptions which the author makes. To assume that the idea of the balance of power persisted in the same form throughout the nineteenth century and that the idea was equally applicable in 1950 as it was in 1850 is an error in analysis. Every historian is very conscious of the difficulties which arise when a concept such as "the balance of power", "natural interests", "capitalism", "socialism", etc., is pursued over a period as long as a century or more. Between the beginning and the end the political, social and economic context has changed and with it the significance which must be attached to each new form. That which the Labour Government foreign policy assumed had its own specific characteristics, as some of the quotations from Mr. Bevin's speeches indicate. To have taken this into account would have thrown a little more light on a "socialist" foreign policy.

—J. GINSWICK.

DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK, 1952; United Nations Statistical Office; New York, 1952.

THIS is the fourth yearbook produced by the Statistical Office of the United Nations, and again it bears evidence of the excellence of much of the work now produced by this and many other specialised agencies of the U.N. In effect we have here a further edition of a world compendium of demographic statistics which is not readily available in any other form, and its scope indicates the high degree of co-operation which the Statistical Office has achieved with member governments of the U.N.

This compendium provides in fact an invaluable handbook to those working in the field of contemporary history, international relations, anthropology and allied subjects who have occasion to refer to quantitative figures of population trends in both highly advanced countries as well as in colonial territories. It is also more than a collection of statistics, for it includes a chapter of technical notes which provides admirably simple and direct statements of problems of interpretation of

various indices which are included in the 400 pages of statistical tables. In these notes the reader is given an appraisal of the reliability of the data presented and of some of the problems related to the collection of vital statistics, such as the lack of an international definition of stillbirths or of a common practice in relation to the registration of live births. The text also goes on to discuss the interpretation which can be put upon such tables as the fertility rates of married women by duration of marriage as well as upon the better known indices of fertility (e.g., gross and net reproduction rates).

In short, from the statistical aspect the Demographic Yearbook gives the reader a bird's-eye-view of population trends, births, deaths, marriages and life expectation throughout the greater part of the world. This volume also includes available data from census results taken in many countries in 1950 and 1951. In a number of countries these censuses were the first taken since prewar years. It also presents a summary of total enumerations of populations and intercensal rates of change over the century since 1850. Vital data, based upon annual statistics, have also been extended to include as the initial year 1920 instead of 1930.

In addition this volume of the yearbook presents a useful brief study of major trends in urbanisation (Chapter I). A feature emphasised here is the high proportion of urban populations now living in cities of 50,000 or more, and the widespread tendency (particularly in Western countries) for cities to have a higher proportion of women than men. The article also restates a phenomenon which has been well known for years, namely the lower fertility of cities compared with rural or farm areas, as well as the higher expectation of life of individuals in the latter.

As with previous issues of the yearbook, this number can be safely recommended as an indispensable handbook for those interested in many non-political aspects of world affairs. To many the very title "Demographic Yearbook" sounds as dry as sawdust. But the person who seriously wishes to learn more of how the world's population is growing and how it is distributed will find fascinating material here. Finally, the production of works of such high scientific quality, dependent as they are for their standards upon effective international co-operation, provides evidence that the U.N. should not be judged entirely by its work at the political level. Behind the trials and tribulations of the U.N. Assembly there have been developing over recent years many lines of effective and useful work, built up by patient and reasonable men.

—W. D. BORRIE.

SEARCH AFTER SUNRISE, by Vera Brittain, 1951; London, Macmillan; pp. 271.

TWICE during the world war Vera Brittain, as an advocate of Indian freedom and a war-resister, was refused official British permission to go to India to attend the All-India Women's Conference. Finally, in 1949 she visited India as a delegate to an international Gandhi Memorial Conference held for discussion of postwar problems and "the creation of peace through spiritual power" along the lines of Gandhi's ideals. Two sessions were held, one at Santiniketan, the former Bengal home of Tagore, and the other in the Central Provinces at Sevagram in Gandhi's latest village community. Vera Brittain also travelled round India and visited Pakistan. This book records her impressions of India and Pakistan in their search for a "sunrise" of renaissance as free nations. It is more than a travel-book, however, since the writer was also searching after fresh sources of wisdom, and her journey is recorded as "an experiment in understanding".

The result is a narrative which will be of interest and value to readers concerned with post-independence developments in India and Pakistan. It has its limitations, since Vera Brittain here writes with sympathy and sincerity rather than with any brilliance or depth. The seeker after spiritual enlightenment will not find, despite the author's aim, anything fresh or important. Parts of the story are devoted to the trivialities of travel which have only a personal interest. As a Westerner, Miss Brittain was a little shocked to find herself back in the "well-and-bucket" society

June, 1953

of Bunyan's day, and was sometimes impatient at India's primitiveness and "amiable inefficiency", just as she rejected Gandhi's asceticism.

On the other hand, she is a veteran writer and trained observer who paints graphic pictures of Benares, Delhi, and Madras as well as of the Conference sessions at the old homes of Tagore and Gandhi. We can get glimpses of Indian life and manners, and of the attitudes in India and Pakistan towards the vexed issue of Kashmir, which was then threatening seriously the peace between the two new nations.

The best things in "Search After Sunrise", however, are the vivid pen portraits of leading personalities, and the interpretations of the contributions made to India—and the world—by Gandhi and Tagore. There is an excellent picture, for example, of Begum Liaquat Ali Khan, whose "sagacious femininity was accompanied by a brilliance which scintillated like a metal mirror", and of the Indian Minister of Health, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, the Indian princess who "played the part of a hyphen. It was she who linked the sensitive, imaginative Nehru and his tough Deputy-Premier, the late Sardar Patel." Finally, there is an illuminating picture of Nehru himself whom Vera Brittain saw as a leader not only of India but also of a newly born, resurgent Asia. "To-day", she considered, "Nehru was India, and India might well be the key to the coming years."

—T. INGLIS MOORE.

GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES CONCERNING UNEMPLOYMENT, INFLATION AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1951-2. United Nations publication, November, 1952; pp. viii and 135; price one U.S. dollar.

THE Department of Economic Affairs of the United Nations conducts an annual inquiry into the full employment and related balance of payments problems of various member nations. The major objective of this inquiry is to find out how far governments have responded to United Nations' recommendations on full employment policies. Questionnaires are submitted to governments, and the replies analysed in a report; the first questionnaire was submitted in December, 1950, and analysis of the replies is to be found in two previous reports, "Problems of Unemployment and Inflation, 1950-51", and "Balance of Payments Trends and Policies, 1950-51".

This report contains analysis of the replies of 25 governments¹ to the questionnaire submitted in February, 1952. The questionnaire was in two parts, one concerned with domestic policies, the other with balance of payments policies. Accordingly the report is divided into two, the first part being concerned with domestic trends and objectives in the economically developed private enterprise economies, in the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe, and in the under-developed countries of Asia and the Far East; the second part is concerned with balance of payments trends and policies, with a special section on the adequacy of foreign exchange reserves. In addition, there is a useful series of appendices, which provide comparisons of the extent of government measures affecting private demand, comparisons of relative economic progress as measured by certain indices, and records of anti-inflationary measures introduced.

In order to encourage governments to have plans ready to combat the growth of unemployment beyond a specified limit, the Economic and Social Council asked for a definition of full employment. Thus it recommended that each country "publish the standard by which it defines the meaning of full employment as a continuing objective of policy, such standard being expressed, whenever possible, in terms either of employment percentages or of absolute numbers of unemployed, or in ranges of such percentages or numbers; and thereafter publish such revised standards as may become necessary from time to time". It is surprising and rather disturbing to learn that few countries have responded to this recommendation. Several countries have in fact adopted policies designed to maintain high levels of employment, but the United Kingdom is the only one that adopted "a specific

full employment standard in full accord with the Council's recommendation". This standard was defined in 1951 as 24% of the whole labour force, including employers and self-employed. The Australian Government did not adopt a fixed quantitative standard, but stated that the aim of its economic policy was not only to "protect the economy, as far as practicable, from developments which could endanger the level of employment by leading to a general deficiency of effective demand, but it also implies an expansion in the economy so that the growing work force may be effectively utilised in increasing the real national product". It is unfortunate that the percentage of Australian unemployment is so difficult to calculate from the available data, and a matter for reproach that in a table of the percentage of unemployment in ten countries, Australia is the only one for which the calculation is not recorded in the report.

However, several countries explained why they had not adopted a fixed quantitative full employment standard. In some cases governments took the rather curious view that the matter was not of immediate interest because existing levels of employment were high, others did not consider the adoption of a standard helpful in the formulation of policy, and some considered that it was impracticable because of heavy dependence on foreign markets. As the report emphasises, the fear of mass unemployment seems to have been replaced by a preoccupation with rising living costs, and the difficulty of maintaining full employment without inflation. This is natural enough in view of the effects of the raw material boom of 1950, and the huge rearmament programmes announced then, but a recession is by no means unlikely if and when these programmes begin to taper off. Economists, like Generals, are apt to concentrate on methods suitable for winning the last war; judging from this report there are few countries with plans ready to put into action should the necessity arise. 'It is true that for most countries the maintenance of full employment and equilibrium in the balance of payments is a matter of international concern, and a complete solution lies outside the scope of action that can be taken by individual countries. But to wait for international agreement and action on these matters without preparing plans for unilateral action that can be taken, is to court disaster. However, it is encouraging to see that some governments have realised that serious pockets of unemployment can exist at the same time as excess demand in other areas of the economy, yet with total unemployment quite low, and that specific measures are then called for, rather than an increase of overall demand. So far, this type of problem has been dealt with in the U.K. and U.S.A. by ad hoc measures such as the redirection of government contracts.

The period covered by the report is, of course, one in which the major problem for most countries was inflation and not unemployment. What stands out clearly from a review of the anti-inflationary measures used is the fact that almost all countries used a combination of monetary measures, fiscal measures, and physical controls. Similarly, in respect of balance of payments problems, most countries have had to use a combination of two types of policy. One, the use of monetary or fiscal measures which influence effective demand generally, but external transactions only indirectly, and hence their action is non-selective and non-discriminating. The other, selective and discriminatory, which directly influences external transactions with particular countries or areas; this type of policy, of course, involves the use of physical controls such as quotas and licences, and exchange control. Considering the difficulties of the period, this armoury of controls has been remarkably effective. Would the same controls be as effective if called upon to operate in the reverse direction, i.e., to prevent deflation and depression, rather than curb inflation and expansion?

The report maintains the high standard set by its predecessors, and is as lucid. It is particularly recommended to pure theorists, price mechanism fetishists, and physical control fanatics.

—E. L. WHEELWRIGHT.

1. Australia, Belgium, Byelorussia, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., Union of S. Africa, U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Vietnam, Yugoslavia.

June, 1953

THE STATE THE ENEMY, by Sir Ernest Benn. Benn, London, 1953; pp. 175; price 12/6 (stg.).

THIS book is "an ex-parte statement in the case of *The Man v. The State*, and makes no pretence to examine the other side of the subject". It consists of a badly written and disjointed attack on "The State", some tedious aphorisms, and a reprint of parts of Spencer's "The Coming Slavery".

As a political pamphlet, its value is nil. It will not convert anybody, and, indeed, it is difficult to believe that Sir Ernest is not writing with his tongue in his cheek. Within the first twenty pages "The State" is made responsible for poverty, muddle, crime, and the increase in divorces. The scapegoat technique has its uses, but, spread over every field of reform and presented in a disjointed manner, it becomes merely tedious.

Yet such a pamphlet has some value—it shows that Spencer is not completely dead and that some people can live through a social revolution conducted in a peaceful manner without having the foggiest idea of its causes. Just because Sir Ernest belongs to a bygone age, it is useful to have his views on record. At least they show fairly clearly how far all of us have "moved with the times". It is salutary to be reminded of the fact that Sir Ernest has not, for contact with historical curiosities may serve as a stimulus to fresh inquiry.

—HENRY MAYER.

CONGRESS. ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE, by Earnest S. Griffith; New York University Press; New York, 1951; pp. vii and 191; 3.50 U.S. dollars.

AFTER a somewhat brash beginning . . . "The Congress of the United States is the world's best hope of representative government" . . . this volume settles down to the business of providing a useful and readable introduction to the workings of Congress. Dr. Griffith is the Director of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, and has therefore had a first-hand view of Congress in action.

If, as Sir Winston Churchill once remarked of Anglo-American affairs, they "were somewhat mixed up together", there is an obvious need for the descendants of the Angles, Saxons and Jutes to become acquainted with the place of Congress in American life, just as there is equal need for Americans to seek understanding of Parliamentary ways.

Readers in the Commonwealth of Nations should not be put off by the first sentence, which Dr. Griffith might have modified had he reflected a moment on the fact that the new Asian members of the Commonwealth opted for parliamentary and not congressional forms of government.

This book is one that he who runs may read and derive a useful idea of Congressional government. It opens with references to the constitutional position of Congress and its organisation, proceeds to deal with the differences which may and do arise between Congress and White House, surveys appropriation practices, and the relation of Congress to foreign affairs, and then takes up a number of other issues, including pressure groups, the public and Congress, and the position of economic planning in Congress. It concludes with some brief and sensible comments, e.g. "The dominant position occupied by the pressure groups requires that their tremendous vitality be in fact channelled into the course of the public interest" (p. 183); and again, speaking of the looseness of party discipline, he says (p. 183-4) "the present trend towards independence and cross-voting should be encouraged. It is in accord with the rational and ethical elements in our culture; it allows more accurate representation for the states and districts; it promotes government by majority; it promotes intelligent criticism".

Dr. Griffith sketches the outlines of factors affecting the formation of a foreign policy. He might have spent more time upon the problem of co-ordination which lies at the heart of the difficulty of devising a flexible, consistent foreign policy.

The Australian Outlook

a thing of harmonious components, and not a criss-cross of disparate elements. Various interesting devices have emerged as pieces of machinery designed to secure this result. A later edition might survey them.

Dr. Griffith has some very interesting remarks upon the status and influence of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report. Admirable as the committee system is in Congress, an "across the board" approach is missing, each committee being an imperium in imperio. The promise of such a broad approach is latent in the new Committee on the Economic Report, but apparently to date it has not exerted particular influence. The further history of this subject is one upon which Dr. Griffith could amplify in any subsequent edition.

On the whole a slender, readable volume, which if it says nothing very new, at least says its piece clearly. The temperature of criticism of Congressional ways and behaviour is low throughout, the author expounding the best side of the subject with a kind of cool and level-headed affection.

—H. D. BLACK.

June, 1953

SHORTER NOTICES

THE ECONOMY OF SPAIN, by Sidney C. Sufrin, Franklin H. Petrasek. Published by the Foreign Policy Association, New York; No. 95; pp. 62; 35 cents; 1952.

This is another of these most useful brief surveys put out by the Foreign Policy Association. The U.S. interest in Spain is considered, together with the economic potential of the country. The role of the State in relation to Spain's economy is discussed. A final section by A. W. Barth and D. Tobler considers Spain's Foreign Trade. Maps are provided, and illustrations.

PRACTICAL ANSWERS TO INFLATION UNEMPLOYMENT TAXATION AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, by C. William Hazelett. Published by Incentivist Publications, Connecticut, 1952; pp. 243; price 50 cents.

An attempt to give all the answers without drawing upon any of the recent theoretical advances in economic science, complete with an "Incentivist Constitution for a World Republic" for good measure.

DOCUMENTS OF HUMANITY, compiled by K. O. Kurth. Publication No. 43 of the Goettingen Research Committee, 1952.

These are reports of "good deeds done by American, English and French PW's or by individual Russians, Poles and Czechs to help those in need, to relieve cold and starvation, to prevent rape and outrage", during the mass expulsion of Germans throughout various parts of Europe. It is an astonishing and moving collection of acts of disinterested goodness, whatever one may think of other issues involved in this movement of population.

PRIZE ARTICLE COMPETITION

By virtue of the gift of £100 by a donor who desires to be anonymous, the Institute has been placed in a position to hold a competition for a prize article. The terms, subjects and conditions of this prize article will be published in the September issue of the "Outlook".

FORTHCOMING EVENTS

June/August	International Law Commission	Geneva
June (4th week)	Technical Assistance Committee	New York
June (last week)	Permanent Central Opium Board	Geneva
June 22-29	FAO-WHO-SEA Regional Nutrition Committee	Bandung
June	FAO International Meeting on Power Control.	Rome
June	FAO Near East Wheat Breeding Meeting	Pakistan
June	ITU International Telephone Consultative Committee	Stockholm
June	Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Body	Geneva
June 22	International Whaling Commission 5th Session	London
June 30-August 7	ECOSOC—16th Session	Geneva
July 1	UNESCO Extraordinary Session of General Conference	Paris
July 19-26	International Congress of Women's Physical Education and Sport	Paris
July 27-August 21	Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction	New York
August 3-20	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions	Geneva
August	1st World Conference on Medical Education	London
August 17-September 8	Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories—4th Session	New York
September 3-8	WHO Committee for Western Pacific—4th Session	Tokyo

June, 1953

INSTITUTE NEWS

Editor's Note

Readers of "The Australian Outlook" will notice that the present and preceding issues differ somewhat in format and style of content from previous issues.

The changes introduced so far, and certain others to come, represent editorial interpretations of various decisions taken by the Commonwealth Council relating to the journal of the Institute.

My task is to try, with the aid of the Associate Editors and the Assistant Editor, to produce an attractive journal of high quality of content, which will promote the objectives of the Institute.

The suggestions, comments and criticisms of the changes to date by readers are welcome.

—H.D.B.

Around The Branches

Branches report a variety of activities. The items below have been supplied by Associate Editors and Secretaries.

CANBERRA BRANCH

Meetings:

5/3/53	T. H. Strong	"Korea And Its Recovery Problems"
25/5/53	Dr. W. E. H. Stanner	"Kenya And The Mau Mau"
7/5/53	His Excellency, Mr. Nurock, Minister for Israel	"Israel's Relations With The Foreign Powers"

On 22nd April, the Branch Council appointed a liaison representative to assist the Director of the Carnegie Endowment United Nations Research Project.

NEW SOUTH WALES BRANCH

Meetings:

16/2/53	Mr. Maurice Webb	"Racial Problems Of South Africa"
10/3/53	Mr. Peter Storrs	"Formosa"
24/2/53	Dr. W. E. H. Stanner	"Kenya And The Mau Mau"
15/4/53	His Excellency, Mr. Mordekhai Nurock	"Israel's Relations With The Foreign Powers"
30/4/53	Mr. Anatole Konovets	"China Under Communism"
11/5/53	Mr. C. P. Fitzgerald	"Should Asians Fight Asians?"
27/5/53	Mr. E. L. Wheelwright	"Britain And The World Economy"
<u>Reading and Discussion Group meetings:</u>		
25/2/53	Mrs. Carolyn Berntsen	"The International Peace Seminar— Quaker Proposals for the Solution of the East-West Deadlock"
25/3/53	Symposium—Mr. Czudowski, Count Poninski, Mr. A. Konovets	"The Present Situation in the U.S.S.R."
22/4/53	Col. J. M. Prentice	"India Today And Tomorrow"
27/5/53	Mr. C. D. Rowley	"Australia, New Guinea And The United Nations"

Monographs:

Vol. IV No. 3, Feb., 1953	Dr. A. Oppenheimer	"The German-Israeli Reparation Agreement"
Vol. IV No. 4, Mar., 1953	R. F. Holder	"The Commonwealth Economic Conference"
Vol. IV No. 5, Apr. 1953	Dr. Albert May	"Food: Humanity's Urgent Concern"

The Branch Council has decided to launch an experiment of holding monthly lunch-hour meetings between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. at its rooms on the first Monday in each month, commencing 6th July. At these meetings one or two speakers will discuss topics of importance of the month in foreign affairs.

QUEENSLAND BRANCH

Meetings

9/3/53	Mr. C. P. Wright	"The Constitution Of Canada"
24/3/53	Mr. J. C. Mahoney	"France And The World"
13/4/53	Sir Stephen Holmes, High Commissioner for the United Kingdom	"Britain's Place In Europe"
11/5/53	Mr. W. R. McDonald	"The Struggle In South-East Asia"
27/5/53	Dr. T. Ross McKenzie	"Canada As I Saw It"

SOUTH AUSTRALIAN BRANCH

Asian Study Group.—This group has had two meetings during the last two months and is now studying China. When study is complete, it is hoped to make a report, with the object of understanding the present situation in China from a geographic, economic and racial point of view and the effect of the impact of other nations on China.

General Members' Meeting.—On 30th April Mr. H. E. Earle, of the "Advertiser", and formerly an Egyptian correspondent for the "Manchester Guardian", addressed the members on Egypt.

On 15th May Dr. C. P. Wright, from Canada, was entertained at lunch by members of the Committee.

TASMANIAN BRANCH

Meetings:

C. P. Wright	"The Crime Of Palestine"
A. Parsons	"Indonesia Today"

VICTORIAN BRANCH

Meetings:

26/2/53, 8 p.m.	Professor O. H. K. Spate	"India And Pakistan: Contrasts And Conflicts"
2/3/53, 8 p.m.	Mr. James Plimsoll	"Korea"
11/3/53, 5 p.m.	Mr. H. C. Lane	"The Technical Assistance Work Of The I.L.O. In The Asian Countries"
18/3/53, 8 p.m.	Lieut.-General Sir Ross McCay	"Pakistan And Some Problems".
24/3/53, 1 p.m.	Mr. Maurice Webb	"South Africa" (Lunchtime discussion for Committee members)

June, 1953

26/3/53, 8 p.m.	Mr. P. J. F. Storrs	"Formosa"
20/4/53, 8 p.m.	Mr. C. P. Wright	"The Economic Relations Of Eastern Canada And The United States, And The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin"
21/5/53, 8 p.m.	Dr. J. Leyser	"Indonesia's Political And Economic Problems"
26/5/53, 5 p.m.	Mr. Peter Howson	"Present Trends In Europe And America"
29/5/53, 8 p.m.	Dr. W. E. H. Stanner	"Kenya And The Mau Mau"

The Branch by custom holds its general meetings mainly at night, but also holds shorter, more informal meetings in the Branch library late in the afternoon, when members have more opportunity to meet each other, and discussion is facilitated. The Branch was very glad to welcome at one of the latter meetings delegates to the I.L.O. Training Institute, while Committee members greatly appreciated the opportunity of meeting the Chairman of the Natal Branch of the South African Institute, Mr. Maurice Webb, and hearing his masterly summary of the situation in South Africa.

Australia's Neighbours: Articles

January	Britain And ANZUS India And Commonwealth Development	J. R. Poynter J. A. C. Mackie
February	The State Of Vietnam Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committees	Geoffrey Fairbairn A. F. Davies
March	Minority Groups In South-East Asia Developments In Malaya	N. D. Harper D. C. S. Sissons
April	U.S. Republican Policy On Formosa The Rangoon Socialist Conference	W. F. Petrie Geoffrey Fairbairn
May	India's First Five-Year Plan Training In Administration Under The Colombo Plan	J. E. Isaac S. Encel

A Forthcoming Review

Dr. Douglas Oliver, an anthropologist on the staff of Harvard University, has kindly undertaken to review at length the volume entitled "The South Seas In Transition" by Dr. W. E. H. Stanner, which was published under the joint auspices of the Australian Institute of International Affairs and the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The review will appear in due course in "The Australian Outlook".

Roy Milne Memorial Lecture

This annual public lecture will be delivered on Thursday, 13th August, 1953, at 8 p.m. in the Assembly Hall, Margaret Street, Sydney. The speaker will be Sir John Latham and his subject "Open Diplomacy". Branch members visiting in Sydney on that date are cordially invited to attend.